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THREE ARGUMENTS ABOUT WAR 
 
Robert L. Tsai* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
America is a nation built on war. This is true not only in the 
historical fact that armed conflict during the Revolutionary period 
secured the independence of a freshly imagined people, and that 
American interests in economics, territory, and security have 
been regularly advanced through war. It is also reflected, more 
generally, in the content of the rule of law, which has increasingly 
has been derived from the country’s war experience. Although 
talk of war permeates public debate, it is a grave mistake to 
presume that all invocations of war are identical. In truth, there is 
a multiplicity of ways in which references to armed conflict can 
appear in constitutional discourse. Acquiring a more 
sophisticated understanding of these occurrences is essential to 
appreciating the stakes involved and determining what, if 
anything, can be done about it. The practice of taking rhetorical 
advantage of war implicates theories of constitutional structure 
and political development, while raising persistent rule of law 
concerns. 
Consider three very different contexts in which the topic of 
war has been engaged in recent years: the targeted killing of 
suspected terrorist Anwar al-Awlaki, President Obama’s efforts 
to mark the end of war in Iraq, and President Obama’s decision 
to “end” his predecessor’s “war on terror.” Observe, too, three 
different ways war can be used in a legal argument. In the first 
example, a claim to an actual state of hostilities plays a central role 
in legal argumentation. On September 30, 2011, the United States 
launched a drone attack at the believed location of al-Awlaki, 
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who was suspected of masterminding Al Qaeda attacks on the 
U.S. The legality of al-Awlaki’s killing depended in large part on 
the assertion that an actual state of armed conflict against Al 
Qaeda existed. Relying on a classified Office of Legal Counsel 
opinion (whose main arguments were later leaked to the media), 
the administration argued that congressional authorization of 
military force against the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks covered 
this situation and that al-Awlaki was a lawful target in the armed 
conflict. The bulk of the arguments turned on whether there was 
a live military conflict against suspected terrorists. Specifically, 
the memo addressed whether a presidential ban on assassination 
or laws against murder applied to the situation, whether al-Awlaki 
and others who might have been present were seized 
unreasonably or deprived of their lives without due process of 
law, and whether the action violated international law.1 
As far-reaching as the OLC position might have been, the 
presidential action nevertheless involved the use of the fact of war 
as a general justification. When military engagements are 
rampant, as they are today, this appears as a routine persuasive 
technique. In the classical form of the argument, a legal actor 
relies upon a claim to the existence of a lawful military conflict to 
defend a course of action. Whether a lawful, live war exists has 
profound legal repercussions. For instance, according to the 
Obama administration, if an individual is a suspected “co-
belligerent” who might be difficult to capture, the government can 
take reasonable means to kill the target. In such event, the 
ordinary rule of law expectations need not apply: the marshaling 
of evidence, trial in front of an impartial magistrate, an 
opportunity to be heard, judgment by one’s own peers. 
Although it represents the most familiar type of war talk, the 
war-as-justification argument poses a recurring set of rule of law 
challenges. Some are definitional: how do we determine if there 
is, in fact, a lawful state of armed conflict and when it starts or 
ends? How many different kinds of military engagements should 
be recognized as constitutionally salient? For instance, lawyers for 
the Bush administration drew a consistent line between a 
declaration of a “legal state of war,” a power accorded to 
 1. See Charlie Savage, Secret U.S. Memo Made Legal Case to Kill a Citizen, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 9, 2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/09/world/
middleeast/secret-us-memo-made-legal-case-to-kill-a-citizen.html?pagewanted=
all&_r=0. In response to the stalled judicial confirmation hearing of David Barron, on May 
20, 2014, the administration promised to release the contents of the OLC memo jointly 
authored by Barron and Martin Lederman.  
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Congress alone, and the President’s inherent authority to use 
military force “in defense of the national security of the United 
States.”2 For Bush’s legal team, this vast category of national 
security engagements allowed the Commander in Chief to pursue 
a host of external and internal measures against suspected 
terrorists and their supporters, including ordering a military strike 
against a nation-state believed to aid terrorism. 
Other standard questions involve how to assess permissible 
ends and means, i.e., just how far should the fact of military 
conflict go to justify coercive actions? What kinds of limiting 
principles on war-justified actions are warranted and feasible? 
The stakes are enormous, for an entire network of state actions, 
policies, institutions, and programs can be built upon an initial 
claim to a temporary state of war. 
Now consider another notable reference to war, one that 
presented a very low possibility for major legal change. As a 
candidate, Barack Obama repeatedly called for the end of actual 
hostilities in Iraq, which he believed to be “misguided.” Once 
elected as President, he gave a speech at Fort Bragg marking the 
end of the Iraq conflict and since then he has repeatedly called 
attention to its anniversary, but made no discernible effort to 
harness popular approval of the “historic moment” in favor of 
legal transformation.3 At most, he recommended that any savings 
be reinvested in aid for veterans and other domestic programs, or 
used to pay for military redeployments to Afghanistan and 
elsewhere. 
Far from calling for the dismantling of the national security 
state or the advancement of new rights based on the gains from 
ending the war, Obama remained content to engage in war 
rhetoric for partisan gain and ordinary policy change. Unlike 
Lincoln or FDR, Obama never argued that the way that the Iraq 
war was fought or concluded should alter the way ordinary people 
understand the Constitution. In passing up the opportunity to 
engage in what I call “war legacy” rhetoric, his efforts presented 
little potential for reshaping the legal order. War legacy 
 2. See Memorandum from John C. Yoo to Daniel J. Bryant, Assis. Att’y Gen., 
Office of Legislative Affairs 1–2, 5, 8 (Oct. 21, 2002). 
 3. See Helene Cooper, Obama Praises Troops as He Ends the War He Opposed, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2011, at A20, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/15/us/at-
fort-bragg-obama-showers-praise-on-troops-back-from-iraq.html. For the impact of war 
on the construction of time to mark the “end,” “beginning,” or ongoing nature of war, see 
generally MARY L. DUDZIAK, WAR TIME: AN IDEA, ITS HISTORY, ITS CONSEQUENCES 
(2012) [hereinafter DUDZIAK, WAR TIME]; Mary L. Dudziak, Law, War, and the History 
of Time, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1669 (2010).  
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arguments have their own tenor, structure, and rule of law 
concerns, but none of these were raised by Obama’s orations on 
Iraq. His election in 2008 heightened expectations of 
transcendence in foreign affairs, but his actions on this front since 
then offer a reminder that not every mention of war poses order-
altering possibilities. 
A third scenario is illustrated by the trope of 
counterterrorism-as-warmaking, a metaphor that permeated 
many institutions and all levels of constitutional discourse after 
9/11. President George W. Bush coined the phrase “global war on 
terror,” which key figures in the administration then used to 
mobilize support for dramatic alterations to the constitutional 
landscape.4 Once in office Obama decided to depart from his 
predecessor on public terminology, preferring instead the 
narrower formulation, “war on al-Qaeda,” or the clunky phrase 
“overseas contingency operation.”5 This rhetorical shift itself is 
notable, confirming a belief that this particular form of war talk 
has power and consequences, and that certain negative 
connotations should be avoided from that point on. Although his 
change in constitutional language signaled an intention to quit 
actively governing through terror, much of the justificatory 
apparatus created by the previous administration remains and 
new interrogation sites have been established.6 If anything, the 
change in public rhetoric hinted at a desire for presidential 
orations on terrorism to do less partisan work even as they 
facilitate institutional flexibility for aggressive, often covert, 
military operations. Ultimately, Obama’s shift in rhetoric is 
consistent with a plan to tinker with the national security order7—
perhaps even to soften its edges or make it more efficient—but 
 4. JAYNE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW THE WAR ON 
TERROR TURNED INTO A WAR ON AMERICAN IDEALS (2008). 
 5. Scott Wilson & Al Kamen, ‘Global War on Terror’ Is Given New Name, WASH. 
POST (Mar. 25, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2009/03/24/AR2009032402818.html. 
 6. Not only has President Obama not closed Guantanamo Bay as promised, but the 
media reports detention centers operating in Afghanistan and Somalia. See, e.g., Jeremy 
Scahill, The CIA’s Secret Sites in Somalia, THE NATION, July 12, 2011, 
http://www.thenation.com/article/161936/cias-secret-sites-somalia#; Rod Nordland, 
Detainees Are Handed Over to Afghans, but Not Out of Americans’ Reach, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 30, 2012, at A4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/31/world/asia/in-
afghanistan-as-bagram-detainees-are-transferred-united-states-keeps-its-grip.html?
pagewanted=all. To his credit, Obama’s Office of Legal Counsel has repudiated certain 
extreme legal positions on the Eighth Amendment, Due Process, and Fourth Amendment 
associated with the investigation of suspects and interrogation of detainees. 
 7. For the contours of the national security order, see generally Jack Balkin, The 
Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1 (2008).  
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augured no design to radically downscale it or attack basic 
assumptions. 
The nuances are important. In each case, a legal actor 
referenced war in making a public law argument, but in each 
instance the idea of war did a different kind of persuasive work. 
In the first case, advocates insisted that the fact of an ongoing war 
licensed a set of coercive programs reasonably adapted to 
prosecuting that conflict. In the second instance, a hot war had 
ended or was soon to be concluded, but a public figure declined 
to use an already mobilized electorate as an engine for legal 
transformation. If he had done so, the nation would have faced a 
distinctive set of concerns over how to do justice to military 
participation and what social meanings should be drawn from the 
people’s wartime experience. In the third case, as with the second, 
the order-changing potential is immense. By characterizing a 
social phenomenon in war-like terms, decisionmakers are not so 
much limited by the parameters of any real military conflict as 
they are impelled by a general sense of crisis. Insofar as a 
pervasive sense of siege can be maintained over time through this 
open-ended discourse, the potential for legal transformation 
remains. 
Why pay close attention to the subtleties in war rhetoric? For 
one thing, the background fact of American military engagement 
around the world is unlikely to change anytime soon, infusing 
war-inspired arguments with a visceral urgency. Americans’ 
experiences, in turn, have altered the tactical possibilities for 
constitutional debate, granting these kinds of arguments history-
laden legitimacy and cultural potency. After generations of 
military conflict, legal actors have grown adept at taking strategic 
advantage of the people’s fears, hopes, and recollections of war. 
We can expect war-dependent arguments in one form or another 
to persist, as advocates of all stripes turn the American people’s 
ideas about armed conflict—either real or imagined—for partisan 
gain and structural change. 
Perhaps the best reason to be more attentive to war speak is 
that serious rule of law concerns are implicated by these various 
forms of constitutional discourse. As a family of arguments, war-
inspired legal assertions raise concerns about transparency, 
accountability, duration, and commensurability. For instance, 
once a nation’s war experience is plentiful, a party invoking a 
particular war may do so less openly, raising concerns about due 
notice of an effort to undertake constitutional transformation. 
Casual, oblique references to war can take the place of more  
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sustained deliberation. Opacity, in turn, may exacerbate 
deficiencies in democratic accountability—namely, raising doubts 
that a policy determination or legal change predicated in part on 
understandings about a nation’s war experience actually captures 
a robust popular judgment. War-dependent arguments may also 
be open-ended in dangerous ways, risks best illustrated by such 
war metaphors as “culture war” or “war on crime.” They blur the 
line between a single, legally authorized event and a permanent 
course of action. Along the way, they can make psychological and 
social linkages between priorities and experiences that are frankly 
incomparable, at least in ways that facilitate quality policy 
determinations. 
If the Constitution is to survive intact against the onslaught 
of war talk, it is surely worth gaining a more refined sense of how 
and why constitutional actors deploy war in their legal arguments. 
Not every invocation of armed conflict carries with it foundational 
consequences, but in the modern age, militaristic rhetoric has 
emerged as a distinctive language of power. The legal system is 
sustained through a national security order that increasingly 
depends upon war rhetoric. That discourse, in turn, has been 
infused with bursts of hyper-patriotism, memories of just wars, 
and fears about illegal or disastrous military conflicts. War 
constitutionalism today holds the potential for political and legal 
development in surprising contexts through the mobilization of 
war sentiments. It is little wonder, then, that public officials are 
tempted to turn to this rhetorical tool to gain partisan, 
policymaking, or interpretive advantage. 
The goal of this Article is to evaluate the practice of war 
constitutionalism and achieve greater clarity about the variations 
that can arise. I begin by defining war constitutionalism as an 
accepted practice in legal discourse. I then assess why it has 
become an integral part of public debate. The remainder of the 
Article assesses three popular forms of war constitutionalism: war 
as a justification, the war legacy argument, and war as a metaphor. 
Each form of war-dependent argumentation not only possesses a 
distinctive structure as a legal argument, but also poses its own set 
of rule of law challenges. 
II. WAR CONSTITUTIONALISM: A DEFINITION 
Not all public references to war have deep legal implications. 
But some do. Let us start with some working definitions. As I 
describe the practice, war constitutionalism entails a customary 
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method of advancing understandings of a governing text.8 It is not 
recognized as a formal mode of constitutional interpretation by 
leading commentators,9 yet it nevertheless has become a 
pervasive feature of modern public debate. Certain explicit kinds 
of war-dependent arguments (especially justifications for war) 
have been discussed from time to time, but rarely have they been 
analyzed in the systematic way proposed here. Whatever the 
precise doctrinal footholds one might use during constitutional 
discourse (e.g., “Commander in Chief” or “freedom of speech” or 
“equal protection of the law”), war-based legal forms have an 
organization and power that is rarely, if ever, cabined by doctrinal 
rules or decisions themselves. Instead, they have been made and 
accepted in a variety of doctrinal contexts, whether or not the 
clauses interpreted deal directly with warmaking. 
War constitutionalism takes place when a legal actor makes 
war-dependent arguments to support an interpretation of a 
foundational legal text. We can tell it occurs when a participant to 
a debate over the meaning of a canonical legal text turns to the 
fact, possibility, memory, or legacy of war as a framing device or 
an explicit reason for adopting a preferred reading of that text. 
The exigency and trauma of military conflict can be a reason or a 
trope, consisting of crises and threats, either real or imagined. 
Thus defined, the practice is a persuasive strategy with broad 
utility. It is a transdoctrinal tool deployed energetically by judges 
as well as activists, and by people with divergent ideological 
commitments. Excluded from this definition are rhetorical 
appeals to war to effectuate changes in ordinary law or policy, 
without broader legal or structural ramifications.10 
We should recognize a democratic actor may be engaged in 
war constitutionalism when he or she: (a) references a specific war 
(a past conflict, an ongoing one, or the prospect of a future war) 
to support a legal position, (b) alludes to principles, ideas, 
practices, or lessons supposedly generated during particular wars 
(e.g., Nazism, Fascism, or anti-totalitarianism), or (c) deploys war 
as a metaphor to characterize a contemporary social problem 
 8. In a constitutional republic, governing texts include any constitution, charter, 
covenant, landmark laws, or judicial rulings that might announce or codify a government’s 
basic powers and guarantees. 
 9. Philip Bobbitt, for instance, identifies six accepted forms of constitutional 
argument, but nothing resembling war constitutionalism is adequately captured by his 
typology. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991). I will argue 
instead that war-dependent arguments straddle several conventional modalities at once. 
 10. Again, Obama’s celebration of the end to hostilities in Iraq is, by definition, not 
an instance of war constitutionalism.  
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(e.g., “war on poverty,” “war on crime,” “war on drugs” or, in 
more recent decades, “culture war” and “war on terror”). While 
there are crucial differences to be hashed out, these moves share 
sufficient family resemblances in terms of structure and function 
so as to merit treatment as variations of a single legal practice. 
Much of the time, the fact of an ongoing conflict is cited as a 
general justification for policy. Think of Korematsu’s11 reliance 
upon a declared war to justify the race-based exclusion and 
internment of Japanese Americans, or the Schenck12 ruling’s 
reference to World War I to justify relaxed review of the 
government’s suppression of socialist propaganda. Both decisions 
take the classical form of the war justification. 
At other times, subtle but crucial differences can be detected. 
The legacy of war might be deployed in order to frame an existing 
controversy or encourage listeners to contemplate the long-term 
legal consequences of a particular war. One can understand FDR 
to have initiated just such an ambitious program of war 
constitutionalism in 1941 when, building support for American 
involvement in Europe, he urged citizens to dedicate themselves 
to enhanced liberties and elevate them to universal rights for all. 
His “Four Freedoms” program (and the altered legal-political 
order necessary to sustain that activist vision) would be the 
nation’s ultimate legacy to future generations. Justice Robert 
Jackson’s 1943 Barnette decision,13 too, is cut from the same cloth, 
as that ruling sought to trade on a legacy of the Second World 
War—the principle of anti-totalitarianism—as a reason to 
vindicate the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ First Amendment right not to 
salute the American flag. 
War-dependent arguments can be marshaled for modest 
ends and discrete matters. They can also be unleashed on a 
grander scale, making up a deliberate, multi-prong program of 
ideological and institutional transformation. In more ambitious 
incarnations, the practice may be directed at altering the path of 
jurisprudential development, dislodging a dominant political-
legal regime, drawing attention to policy priorities, or 
empowering certain sectors of the political community in the hope 
 11. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
 12. The Schenck Court stated that free speech rights during wartime differ from 
rights in “ordinary times.” See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (“When a 
nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its 
effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight and that no Court could 
regard them as protected by any constitutional right”). 
 13. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).  
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of forging an alternative governing coalition. But what makes the 
rhetorical manipulation of war an exercise in constitutionalism are 
the actor’s motivations in reshaping fundamental law. Whatever 
the substantive areas affected, one’s ultimate ends must be the 
establishment of controlling laws, rules, policies, values, habits, 
social networks, or dependable institutions for the governance of 
routine matters.14 
As we shall see, war constitutionalism has evolved into a legal 
practice through instrumental deployment by lawyers and elected 
officials as a problem-solving technique across a wide array of 
subjects. This has occurred repeatedly over a significant period of 
time, with a broad spectrum of actors tacitly accepting the 
legitimacy of the approach. 
A. WAR DEPENDENT ARGUMENTS IN THE FLAG SALUTE 
CASES: “THE JUDGEMENT THAT HISTORY AUTHENTICATES” 
A few caveats are in order. War constitutionalism is not the 
exclusive province of particular political parties, institutions, or 
sectors of society. As a legal practice, it has proven to be pervasive 
and resilient despite the fact that formally the President serves as 
Commander in Chief and only Congress is empowered to declare 
war. Judges as much as politicians have tried to reinterpret the 
Constitution in the name of war. So have school officials, artists, 
and activists.15 
The fact or prospect of military conflict has often been cited 
to expand governmental powers at the expense of rights. Even 
so—and contrary to popular lore—the mere mention of war does 
not automatically result in repressive behavior by the state. Under 
the right circumstances, the practice can facilitate an expansion of 
rights. This is precisely what happened with the famous 
controversy over the compulsory flag salute in the 1940s. The 
Justices of the United States Supreme Court and other legal 
actors successfully shaped the meaning of the First Amendment 
in terms of military conflict, one that ultimately expanded 
 14. See generally ANN SOUTHWORTH, LAWYERS OF THE RIGHT: 
PROFESSIONALIZING THE CONSERVATIVE COALITION (2008); STEVEN M. TELES, THE 
RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT: THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE 
LAW (2008). 
 15. See generally Robert L. Tsai, The Ethics of Melancholy Citizenship, 89 OR. L. 
REV. 557 (2010) (analyzing how Langston Hughes’s poetry invoked war strategies, 
realities, and aspirations to prod social engagement, particularly in relation to racial 
equality and poverty).  
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individual liberties. Both sides of the debate engaged in war 
constitutionalism, but employed somewhat different arguments. 
Two forms of war rhetoric appeared in the original Gobitis 
decision that went against the Jehovah’s Witnesses: war 
justification and war legacy. Justice Frankfurter, writing for the 
majority, emphasized the fact of the global conflict as a reason for 
deference to school officials engaged in the “promotion of 
national cohesion.”16 The ongoing military struggle rendered the 
principle of mutual self-defense not merely salient, but also “an 
interest inferior to none in the hierarchy of legal values.”17 
According to the Supreme Court, “National unity is the basis of 
national security” and school officials were entitled to play an 
active role in fostering a political order founded on patriotism 
even when rituals must be enacted under duress.18 Frankfurter 
also made a war legacy argument to bolster this second point, 
invoking the Civil War: “Situations like the present are phases of 
the profoundest problem confronting a democracy—the problem 
which Lincoln cast in memorable dilemma: ‘Must a government 
of necessity be too strong for the liberties of its people, or too 
weak to maintain its own existence?’”19 
Justice Frankfurter’s answer favored the perception of 
national strength (“cohesive sentiment”) over an appearance of 
weakness through division (by “weaken[ing] the effect of the 
exercise”). Juxtaposing two historical moments when the nation 
found itself at war (the Civil War and World War II), Justice 
Frankfurter suggested that the legal stakes should be deemed 
comparable. Furthermore, the fact that national unity proved 
critical to the successful prosecution of the war during that past 
conflict meant that national cohesion should be similarly prized as 
an appropriate war-facilitating value now. Thus, school officials 
had the constitutional authority to punish the Jehovah’s 
Witnesses for not saluting the American flag. 
Justice Robert Jackson’s opinion in Barnette, which 
overruled Gobitis three years later, struck a very different posture 
with regard to the emerging practice of war constitutionalism. 
Justice Jackson rejected some variations of the practice, while 
energetically making war-dependent arguments of his own. 
Jackson scoffed at Frankfurter’s Civil War precedent, writing, “It 
 16. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940). 
 17. Id. at 595. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 596.  
 
THREEARGUMENTSWAR_DRAFT 2 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/29/2014 3:02 PM 
2015] THREE ARGUMENTS ABOUT WAR 11 
may be doubted whether Mr. Lincoln would have thought that the 
strength of government to maintain itself would be impressively 
vindicated by our confirming power of the State to expel a handful 
of children from school.”20 He simultaneously cast doubt on the 
suggestion that two wartime presidents would have seen the issues 
the same way and denied that a significant national power—actual 
warmaking—was at stake in the flag salute controversy. 
Instead, Justice Jackson demanded a close fit between the 
actual powers used in an earlier war and the powers implicated by 
the conflict underway before a wartime precedent should be cited. 
He further rejected Frankfurter’s assertion that ongoing 
hostilities were sufficient in this instance to alter the legal calculus. 
Jackson read the power to wage war to be the exclusive province 
of the federal government, something not implicated by the 
school board policy. For lack of fit, the Barnette decision rejected 
both the Civil War analogy and any argument premised on the 
ongoing war.21 
More generally, Justice Jackson warned of the dangers posed 
by casual reliance on war-based arguments in judicial decision 
making: “Such oversimplification, so handy in political debate, 
often lacks the precision necessary to postulates of judicial 
reasoning.”22 There are two nested ideas captured by this 
criticism: first, an institutional claim as to the uniqueness of 
judicial interpretation; and second, an assertion that war-
dependent assertions can be inappropriate when judges make law. 
Beyond logical imprecision, Jackson had a more general objection 
to war-dependent arguments: they fostered utilitarian 
calculations. “If validly applied to this problem,” he observed, 
“the utterance cited [as to the Civil War] would resolve every 
issue of power in favor of those in authority and would require us 
to override every liberty thought to weaken or delay execution of 
their policies.”23 Jackson worried that war-dependent arguments 
tilted legal analysis decisively in favor of governmental action and 
encouraged a brute utilitarian calculus in which no individual 
citizen could prevail. By more carefully restricting the salience 
 20. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 636. 
 21. Id. at 642 n.19 (“The Nation may raise armies and compel citizens to give military 
service. It follows, of course, that those subject to military discipline are under many duties, 
and may not claim many freedoms that we hold inviolable as to those in civilian life” 
(citations omitted)). 
 22. Id. at 636. 
 23. Id.  
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and scope of war-based arguments, his analysis created space for 
a jurisprudence of individual rights. 
But things are never quite as simple as they seem. Although 
Justice Jackson demolished Justice Frankfurter’s previous war-
inspired arguments in systematic fashion, he never called into 
question the form of the arguments. Rather, he then resorted to 
war-dependent arguments of his own by staking a claim to the 
legacy of the Second World War. He built the case against a 
mandatory flag salute in part by describing local officials as 
“village tyrants” and reminding the populace of “the fast failing 
efforts of our present totalitarian enemies.”24 Along the way, 
Justice Jackson turned the repressive behavior of external 
enemies (Nazis then, Communists in subsequent cases) into a 
negative prototype for measuring the legality of actions by 
domestic officials. He molded the historically contingent fact of 
war into a set of normative grounds, legal constructs, and other 
doctrinal tools for extending the reach of the First Amendment to 
protect the unusual beliefs of the Jehovah’s Witnesses. Ruling in 
favor of these particular dissenters, and reorienting American 
institutions toward a generous protection of free speech and 
religious liberty, comprised part of the politico-legal strategy of 
winning the war at home. 
The war-driven exchanges between the two duly constituted 
judicial bodies in the early 1940s ultimately resulted in a 
broadened right of conscience, dependent in part upon a just war 
as its general rationale.25 Jackson called this interpretive 
approach—which entailed taking account of how war-inspired 
nationalism had fueled racism and authoritarianism—rendering a 
“judgment that history authenticates.”26 Barnette approved war 
constitutionalism, albeit with a substantive reading of the First 
Amendment and the nation’s war experience that differed from 
that announced in Gobitis. 
What this and so many other similar incidents reveal is that 
the mobilization of people, institutions, resources, and ideas in the 
 24. Id. at 638, 641. 
 25. Barnette suggests that local school officials’ attempt at war-based 
constitutionalism pales in comparison to the perceived prerogative of Congress in actually 
trying to wage war. Even so, the decision stops well short of barring state or local officials 
from conducting patriotic displays altogether. Such actors can step into the gap when they 
are not prohibited from acting by the federal government, but they must still do so in a 
way that respects individual rights. As for arguments about war, Barnette rejected only a 
popular form of war constitutionalism when local actions interfere with a constitutional 
right. 
 26. Id. at 640.  
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name of war has been a popular technique of adding to the 
constitutional corpus. In fact, a good many bedrock legal rules and 
constitutional grammar can be counted as direct descendants of 
armed conflict.27 Many of these war-based articulations of rights 
or powers have little or nothing to do with actually conducting a 
war. Rather, they take the form of reasons why America fights or 
consideration of what, looking backward, we consider to be 
legacies of a war that has been well fought. 
Once we become sensitized to the phenomenon of war-
inspired interpretations of the Constitution, it is easier to notice 
its abundance. War-strengthened rights include the right of 
conscience, mass demonstration, racial equality, the right to serve 
in the military, religious freedom, and the right of counsel. War-
weakened ideals, during hot wars as well as at key moments of the 
Cold War, have included the rights of dissent and association. At 
different times and under different legal regimes, one might see 
distinct patterns with respect to each of these war-inflected rights. 
B. WHY DOES WAR CONSTITUTIONALISM WORK? 
Legal arguments that draw on the phenomenon of war enjoy 
persuasive power because of America’s unique historical 
experiences, the fact that governing institutions have embraced 
war-dependent arguments in the past, the cognitive dimensions of 
war rhetoric, and even because of the significant gaps in 
constitutional text. 
Americans’ lived experiences with war represent the largest 
component of this body of knowledge. War has been a constant 
and pervasive part of American life.28 The seemingly never-
 27. As I have argued elsewhere, a great deal of modern First Amendment law 
consists of the mobilized rhetoric of the Second World War and subsequent Cold War. See 
generally ROBERT L. TSAI, ELOQUENCE AND REASON: CREATING A FIRST AMENDMENT 
CULTURE (2008); see also Robert L. Tsai, Reconsidering Gobitis: An Exercise in 
Presidential Leadership, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 363, 365 (2008). Mary Dudziak and others 
have made similar arguments on behalf of the development of the discourse of equality, 
suggesting the conditions under which they might be made, but without making any strong 
normative claims as to how such arguments might be assessed. See generally MARY L. 
DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY (2002); RICHARD A. PRIMUS, THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE OF RIGHTS 
(1999). Rogers Smith and Philip Klinkner do make an effort to elaborate the basic 
conditions of major political change on behalf of rights, but they too are centrally 
concerned with elaborating an explanatory model rather than coming up with a framework 
for determining when war-inspired changes ought to be treated as binding norms within 
the American constitutional tradition. See ROGERS SMITH & PHILIP KLINKNER, THE 
UNSTEADY MARCH: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF RACIAL EQUALITY IN AMERICA (1999). 
 28. See generally DUDZIAK, WAR TIME, supra note 3.  
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ending fact of war has allowed popular understandings of war’s 
rationales, ends, and duration to be routinely manipulated for 
legal and political ends. Not only has military conflict been a 
defining part of our cultural backdrop, particular wars have been 
thought to yield legal principles. That is to say, the intensive 
mobilization that surrounds war is treated not merely as an 
irrational or irrelevant occurrence, but rather, in some cases, as a 
legitimate engine of constitutional innovation. The Revolutionary 
War, Civil War, World Wars, and Cold War are all believed to be 
historical moments when organized violence threatened the basic 
legal order, provoked deep reflection on foundational values, and 
ultimately yielded enduring principles, either during hostilities or 
after the fighting had ended. Some of these legal ideas have been 
codified in amendments to the U.S. Constitution (most notably, 
the Reconstruction Amendments), while other war-inspired ideas 
have become entrenched in statutes (say, the War Powers Act) 
and judicial decisions like Barnette. 
Part of the answer is found in political theory. Liberalism 
demands that state-sponsored violence be justified. Most theories 
of the state begin with the need for individual self-defense, which 
then ripens into a collective right of self-defense. Libertarian 
theories take the theory through mutual compacts for self-defense 
and stop at the minimal state.29 Those who prefer a more robust 
state go further in elaborating the core powers of the ideal state. 
But whatever type of state is ultimately envisioned, it is 
commonplace to say that the state’s paramount obligation is to 
protect the people. “Security against foreign danger is one of the 
primitive objects of civil society,” Madison explained. “It is an 
avowed and essential object of the American Union.”30 The 
principle of mutual self-defense forms the theoretical foundation 
for the classical form of the war justification. 
What this also means is that, as a baseline matter, citizens are 
ideologically conditioned to respond viscerally to claims that a 
crisis risks the survival of the state and themselves. When legal 
actors make constitutional arguments justified by the existence of 
armed conflict, they trigger the complex political, psychological, 
and cultural frameworks that prioritize such external threats as 
problems of the first order requiring swift and decisive responses. 
Thus, we do well not to underestimate the cognitive dimensions 
 29. See, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1977). 
 30. THE FEDERALIST NO. 41, at 256 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).  
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of war talk—its power to shape mindsets, attitudes, concepts, and 
even behavior. 
War legacy arguments operate somewhat differently than 
appeals to a live war: they respond to the people’s rational need 
to make sense of a chaotic and destructive event after the fact. 
They trade on a polity’s desire for sacrifices to be honored, 
civilizations rebuilt, and the rule of law restored. In a republic, it 
is believed that victory on the battlefield should be translated into 
the terms of virtue, drawing moral lessons from crises to perfect 
the legal order and foster good citizenship. 
Figurative uses of war appeal to a different need entirely, 
namely, that we need prototypes and analogies from which to 
make sense of and make snap judgments about our social 
experiences. This desire to manage the social world through 
comparisons is deeply rooted in human nature, but also incredibly 
difficult to control. Once a chain of cultural and psychological 
associations have been wrought from Americans’ war 
experiences, it is then tempting—in an environment steeped in 
war—for legal actors to describe other crises or priorities in 
similarly alarmist terms. 
Finally, war-dependent arguments help to fill gaps in 
constitutional text and practice by satisfying a deep desire for 
salience. Intellectually, we may understand the law’s claim on us 
even if we never played a part in deliberating over a particular law 
or consenting to its terms. But social contract theory and brute 
power arguments still strike many of us as providing incomplete 
claims to legal legitimacy. This nagging doubt about the 
Constitution’s continuing claim of authority on generations of 
citizens who did not participate in its framing is exacerbated by 
the passage of time and by the obstacles to making formal 
amendments to the document. Enter: the body of customs and 
precedents that have arisen to help make the 1787 text relevant to 
our own time. On this view, the ascendance of war 
constitutionalism as a social practice is evidence that formal 
approaches to interpreting the Constitution are not enough—
each generation demands its own tangible way of making ancient 
obligations salient to their lives and experiences. By interpreting 
foundational commitments through their own war experiences, 
Americans insist that more recent history matters at least as much 
as ancient history. 
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C. CAUTIONARY NOTES 
Despite the power and even the growing pedigree of war-
dependent arguments, serious risks remain. The primary 
democratic concerns revolve around how to justify war-based 
constitutionalism and how to contain the risks of abuse. I begin 
with four observations. First, by its very nature, war-dependent 
arguments are not tethered to the language or precise history 
surrounding the writing or ratification of the Constitution. In this 
very important sense, it is a non-textual tool of interpretation that 
is inherently open-ended. Instead, the form of argument is limited 
only by the actual experiences and memories of the living, along 
with any interpretative rules imposed upon their usage. Second, 
and cutting in the other direction, appeals to war in the service of 
constitutional interpretation usually follow a coherent structure. 
Third, such appeals are not constrained by the actual 
circumstances of war, as the arguments are made during hot wars, 
undeclared wars, military conflicts, and even peacetime. Fourth, 
opposition to war-inspired arguments rarely, if ever, challenges 
the propriety of using war as a basis for making legal claims, thus 
suggesting widespread (if not always overt) acceptance of the 
legitimacy of war constitutionalism. 
War rhetoric is attractive because, in a pluralistic and 
fragmented legal order, it possesses the power to unify and 
mobilize. In part because modern liberalism is individualistic and 
non-judgmental, it can also be alienating. Both modern liberalism 
and libertarianism promote thin, mutual ties of affinity and 
respect. The language of war heightens the stakes of a social 
conflict, identifies allies and enemies, puts opponents on their 
heels, and spurs people to action like few other techniques can. 
The argument has what might be called a communitarian quality, 
with the power to inspire self-sacrifice for others, respect for 
broader principles, and love of country. Through this mode of 
argumentation, a constitutional actor can draw upon more recent 
historical episodes rather than rely on a revolutionary past that 
may no longer inspire belief and action in Americans living in the 
twenty-first century. As we have moved farther away from the 
colonists’ break from Great Britain and the particulars of their 
grievances and lifestyle, it has become harder for that generation’s 
experience alone to generate anything like normative authority 
among the living. A people’s war experiences—to supplement the 
Founding—can serve as a compelling way of revitalizing history 
to inculcate constitutional fidelity, i.e., the feelings of attachment, 
duty, and respect key to the survival of a written constitution. 
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The problem, however, is that a war experience is not 
understood in the same way by all who lived through it, much less 
by those who learn about a war purely through secondary sources. 
Legal arguments that assert the existence of, and depend upon, a 
dominant understanding of history may try to impose an 
impossible or unrealistic consensus. To a large extent, of course, 
this is true of all history-dependent arguments. This difficulty has 
never been reason enough to put historical arguments out of 
bounds. And yet the possibility should not be dismissed out of 
hand that wars—with the unequal suffering, rancor, and 
xenophobia that seem always to be unleashed—may prove 
uniquely polarizing when injected into constitutional debate. In 
other words, there is a danger that, for any particular military 
conflict, the anticipated legal stability hoped for is actually 
undermined by popular memories of that war. This insight about 
anticipated social cohesiveness offers an explanation for why 
older wars and victorious wars are more often cited by legal actors 
in constitutional discourse. In referencing glorious conflicts, it 
may appear easier to project a unity of purpose and to generate 
the minimal social approval necessary to maintain legal 
appearances. 
Finally, war-inspired interpretations of the Constitution can 
be entrenched in any number of ways—through statute, judicial 
opinion, administrative action, or political rhetoric—that may not 
be equivalent in terms of visibility, accountability, or permanence. 
The relative degree to which these legal positions can be codified 
compounds inherent difficulties in studying war as a vehicle for 
legal innovation. 
III. WAR AS A JUSTIFICATION 
On any number of occasions, the fact that a military conflict 
is underway or imminent is given as a reason for doing X.31 When 
this occurs, war is being presented as a reason for action or as a 
ground for decision. This form of the war-dependent argument is 
the most prevalent in constitutional discourse, and, as earlier 
discussed,32 for good cause. Because of its general structure (a 
premise, a proposal, and appeal to logic), such an argument is 
easily identified and therefore can be most readily disputed. The 
 31.  War as a justification for doing X should not be confused with a justification for 
war in the first instance. The latter is a rationale for waging war, while the former is a 
secondary strategic move, contingent on the fact of armed conflict. 
 32. See generally supra Part I.B.  
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substance of the argument may be explosive and far-reaching, and 
citizens themselves may be prone to respond to it viscerally, but 
the form of the argument itself poses no special dangers apart 
from having to grapple with its particulars. It is susceptible to 
contestation according to the rule of reason, in law as in politics. 
And given that self-defense and collective welfare represent core 
rationales for the state itself, arguments about national security or 
emergency cannot be excluded from legal argumentation a priori. 
Because this form of the argument at first blush satisfies the 
principles of reason and transparency, we rarely see an objection 
that a war justification is “out of bounds” so long as a claim to a 
live war is plausible. It may be a poor reason or backed by thin 
evidence, but these are different kinds of objections. Instead, 
having encountered such arguments before, one expects to move 
swiftly to a more fine-grained engagement with the particulars of 
the position staked out by a proponent of war constitutionalism. 
A claim of actual exigency organizes the entire conversation: one 
that is order-threatening, pervasive, and unavoidable. 
A. JAPANESE-AMERICAN INTERNMENT: THE CONVENTIONAL 
FORM OF THE ARGUMENT 
Arguments predicated on a live war as a justification assume 
a recurring form. Take Hirabayashi v. United States,33 in which the 
Supreme Court upheld a curfew for all individuals of Japanese 
ancestry, as well as for resident aliens from Germany and Italy. 
This decision laid the logical groundwork for later internment 
decisions.34 Writing for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Harlan 
Fiske Stone began with this seemingly ironclad proposition: 
“Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are 
by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are 
founded upon the doctrine of equality.”35 But he then briskly 
pivoted, relying on Congress’s declaration of war against Japan 
(as well as the Pearl Harbor attack) to justify a relaxation of that 
standard: “We may assume that these considerations would be 
controlling here were it not for the fact that the danger of 
espionage and sabotage, in time of war and of threatened invasion, 
 33. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). 
 34. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Yasui v. United States, 320 
U.S. 115 (1943). 
 35. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 100.  
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calls upon the military authorities to scrutinize every relevant fact 
bearing on the loyalty of populations in the danger areas.”36 
Importantly, the Court defended its parsimonious reading of 
the Equal Protection Clause in terms of the dangers of espionage 
and sabotage—concerns heightened by an attack by a foreign 
power and the commencement of formal hostilities. Justice Stone 
not only described the context as “a time of war,” but also 
declared the domestic arena in which the curfew operated as part 
of the “war setting.”37 Similarly, Justice Murphy argued that 
ongoing warfare allowed the executive to control property and 
persons in ways that might not be permitted in “normal times.”38 
The live war argument influenced the determination of not only 
whether governmental action was backed by sufficient empirical 
evidence, but also whether the curfew itself amounted to a 
reasonable response to war. Existing war conditions made the 
need for “some restrictive measures . . . urgent.”39 
Now, an opponent to these measures could reject the causal 
claim that the affected community has actually interfered with the 
government’s warmaking powers. One could also doubt the 
immediacy of any threat of invasion or the risk of sabotage.40 But 
there can be no denying that the Court’s persuasive strategy as a 
whole amounted to the use of a declared war as a general 
justification for race-based domestic. 
 36. Id. (emphasis added). This passage raises two possibilities: one, the wartime 
paradigm calls for special or exigent rules; or two, wartime calls for merely deferential 
application of ordinary rules. The first option by definition implies a temporary lawlessness 
during which time effective judicial review is not operable or feasible; the second option 
suggests normal time in which regular but deferential review occurs. The internment cases 
are probably best explained by the second reading simply because the Court proceeds to 
engage in judicial review, though some of the language suggests the review is so deferential 
as to be non-existent. For example, to conclude that “we cannot reject as unfounded the 
judgment of the military authorities” suggests the Justices reviewed only for irrationality, 
and finding no arbitrary motivation, asked no further questions. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 
218 (citing Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 99). 
 37. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 101. 
 38. Id. at 109 (Murphy, J., concurring). 
 39. Id. at 101. 
 40. In fact, in an effort to undermine the legitimacy of the ruling, advocates later 
tendered evidence showing that the threat of invasion and sabotage was overblown by the 
administration, but DOJ lawyers did not apprise the courts of the fruits of their 
surveillance. See Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1420 (N.D. Cal. 1984) 
(granting Korematsu’s coram nobis petition because government “deliberately omitted 
relevant information and provided misleading information in papers before the court”); 
Neal Katyal, Confession of Error: The Solicitor General’s Mistakes During the Japanese-
American Internment Cases, THE JUSTICE BLOG (May 20, 2011), 
http://blogs.justice.gov/main/archives/1346 (stating that the Solicitor General’s failure to 
inform the Supreme Court of the Ringle Report, which found that Japanese Americans 
posed a minimal security threat, “might approximate the suppression of evidence”).  
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The internment decisions served as a crucial link in a complex 
emergency legal regime that delegated lawmaking powers to 
military authorities on the West Coast and authorized sweeping 
detention measures during wartime. According to the war-
dependent logic provided by the High Court, “the conditions of 
modern warfare” require that “the power to protect must be 
commensurate with the threatened danger.”41 Once framed this 
way, the resulting debate centered on actual hostilities and 
whether the challenged measures implicated the government’s 
ability to successfully prosecute war, as it should have. 
The responses to an argument predicated upon a military 
crisis are legion. An opponent could deny that a conflict is an 
authorized war (or contend that its authorization is defective), 
argue that the proposed course of action is not essential to the 
conduct of war, and so on. Under the right circumstances, one 
could argue that the target of regulation is so distant from the 
nation’s war aims that the claim of emergency is correspondingly 
weakened. In this instance, one could claim that broad-based 
domestic restrictions on people not obviously involved in the war 
should be viewed more skeptically than, say, decisions to 
safeguard specific national security sites or troop deployment 
decisions. 
Still, to recognize that the form of the argument is legitimate 
is not to deny that it has its own rule of law challenges. The 
internment cases illustrate a distinctive feature of war justification 
arguments: they appear presentist in orientation. That is, they 
typically focus on the emergency at hand, preferring not to dwell 
on the long-term consequences of a legal action, but instead to 
wall off such considerations from scrutiny. Hence, we should take 
note of the argument’s tendency to sharply restrict the scope of 
relevant conversation. 
In Hirabayashi, for example, Justice Stone’s opinion upheld 
a wartime curfew for Japanese Americans and Japanese 
nationals, along with German and Italian nationals. The Justices 
adopted a narrow conception of equality when they stated that 
only strong evidence of racial animus would overcome the war-
enhanced legal standard. The fact of a live war changed how the 
Court viewed the government’s motivations in creating a race-
based military order, with the Court finding that the petitioner 
“was not excluded from the Military Area because of hostility to 
 41. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 220.  
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him or his race [but was rather] excluded because we are at war 
with the Japanese Empire.”42 
The Hirabayashi Court also denied any far-reaching impact 
of the ruling simply by refusing to entertain any further thoughts 
about such a possibility. “We decide only the issue as we have 
defined it,” Justice Stone insisted,43 excluding any considerations 
of the consequences of accepting race-based decisions in the name 
of making war. Similarly, in Korematsu, Justice Black repeatedly 
stressed that “time was short” because of “military urgency.”44 He 
deplored “hindsight” analysis and claimed that the decision was 
limited to upholding the government’s order excluding Japanese 
Americans from the military area “as of the time it was made and 
when the petitioner violated it.”45 The Court’s presentist 
orientation led to some surreal and hyperformalist moments, such 
as when the Justices said they would only review the legality of 
the government’s exclusion orders rather than any “future” order 
establishing the internment camps46—but by the time the case had 
reached the High Court, all such orders had been carried out. 
But treating doctrinally-oriented consequentialist arguments 
as irrelevant while throwing open the door to warmaking 
consequences may not be principled for two reasons. First, if the 
assumption is that a wartime rationale expires the moment war 
ends, it assumes we can know when war has ended.47 This might 
be relatively easy to do within the traditional paradigm initiated 
by open declarations of war and concluded through the signing of 
an armistice, but what happens when we encounter war 
justifications during military conflicts with no obvious end in 
sight? Even where, as in the internment cases, doctrinal 
consequences are left for another day to be dealt with, there is no 
denying that there may be such an impact at a later date, when the 
next emergency arises or the next policy measure is to be reviewed 
(the problem illustrated by Justice Jackson’s proverbial loaded 
gun).48 
 42. Id. at 223. 
 43. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 102. 
 44. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223–24. 
 45. Id. at 219. 
 46. Id. at 220–22. 
 47. Note, for instance, that Justice Roberts, in dissent, argued that the passage of 
time since Pearl Harbor should be counted against the government, undermining the 
government’s claim to require every possible tool at its disposal during wartime. Id. at 226 
(Roberts, J., dissenting). 
 48. As Jackson argued in dissent, a judicial decision sanctioning a poor war 
justification could do more harm than the justification itself. “The principle then lies about 
like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible  
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Second, one must fight the tendency toward simple 
utilitarianism at the expense of other constitutional values, such 
as dignity and equality. Justice Black expressed this logic when he 
stated that “hardships are part of war, and war is an aggregation 
of hardships.”49 But wartime burdens are never equivalent, and 
there are structural reasons to believe that decisions ostensibly 
created in wartime can generate path-dependent political 
investments that later become more difficult to defund or transfer 
(say, investment in enhanced surveillance and interrogation 
procedures following even judicial rulings that cautiously approve 
policies). Not every emergency-style order is reviewed by a court 
or presents a live controversy once review occurs. By contrast, the 
logic of war-enhanced justifications can permeate official policy 
and institutions and acquire an irresistible quality. 
If there is a criticism to be leveled here, then, it is that slippery 
slope arguments are treated as off-limits precisely when they 
make the most sense. Crises highlight short-term stakes at the 
expense of long-term consequences. War justifications made 
during crises marshal enormous amounts of force, rhetorically 
reducing objections and objectors to a kind of necessary but 
unfortunate collateral damage. To counter the inclination to 
mortgage the future by betting everything on immediate, decisive 
action, one must find ways of ensuring that long-term 
considerations, both principled and pragmatic, play a role in 
public deliberation. Even if one does not ultimately stand in the 
way of emergency measures taken during a hot war, careful 
consideration of foreseeable doctrinal consequences may lead 
decision makers to handle war justifications more carefully. 
B. AUMF AND 9/11 
A more recent example of the war justification approach can 
be found in the 2001 congressional authorization for 
counterterrorism activities. Citing the attacks of 9/11 as “acts of 
treacherous violence,” Congress invoked the nation’s “rights to 
self-defense and to protect United States citizens both at home 
and abroad.” The terrorists’ “grave acts of violence” served as the 
basis for a broad grant of authority to the president to “use all 
necessary and appropriate force against those nations, 
organizations, or persons” who “planned, authorized, committed, 
claim of an urgent need. Every repetition imbeds that principle more deeply in our law and 
thinking and expands it to new purposes.” Id. at 246. 
 49. Id. at 219.  
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or aided the terrorist attacks,” or “harbored such organizations or 
persons” or will “prevent any future acts of international 
terrorism against the United States.”50 
Since 2001, the authorization has been cited as the basis for a 
widening circle of governmental policies, including the detention 
and interrogation of “enemy combatants,” the war in 
Afghanistan, the use of military commissions to try suspected 
terrorists, the program on targeted killings and drone strikes, and 
even domestic surveillance programs. The AUMF has been 
invoked not only in public debates, but also during litigation and 
legal memoranda prepared by administration lawyers.51 
These developments illustrate that one of the major 
difficulties with war justifications is subject matter spillover. That 
is to say, once a state of armed conflict has been more or less 
established, that fact may be used to justify other exigencies 
across a spectrum of social domains. The problem then shifts from 
ascertaining the extent and immediacy of a live threat to 
determining whether governmental actions taken in the name of 
fighting a war is reasonably related to existing war policy. The 
further away from the core of that war policy a measure is, and 
the more a measure departs from past practices, the more likely 
external legal limits (those arising from the Bill of Rights, 
international agreements, or other sources of international law) 
might be enforced. 
 50. Authorization for Use of Military Force § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224 (codified at 50 
U.S.C. § 1541 note) (2001)[hereinafter AUMF]. 
 51. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 515 (2004) (stating that AUMF 
authorized Afghanistan action and detention of person marked as “enemy combatant”); 
John O. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, 
Remarks at Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: The Ethics and Efficacy 
of the President’s Counterterrorism Strategy (Apr. 30, 2012), 
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/the-efficacy-and-ethics-us-counterterrorism-strategy 
(explaining that drone attacks are legal in part because the AUMF authorizes the president 
“to use all necessary and appropriate forces” against those “nations, organizations, and 
individuals responsible for 9/11”); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LAWFULNESS OF A LETHAL 
OPERATION DIRECTED AGAINST A U.S. CITIZEN WHO IS A SENIOR OPERATIONAL 
LEADER OF AL-QA’IDA OR AN ASSOCIATED FORCE 1-2 (2011), available at 
http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf.; 
Basardh v. Obama, 612 F. Supp. 2d 30, 34 (D.D.C. 2009) (citing Respts’ Mem. Regarding 
the Government’s Detention Authority Relative to Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay, 
Dkt. No. 126, Civ. No. 05–889, at 1, 3–8 (Mar. 13, 2009); U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Legal 
Authorities Supporting the Activities of the National Security Agency Described by the 
President (Jan. 19, 2006) (explaining the President authorized the NSA to intercept 
international communication between individuals linked to Al Qaeda). My limited goal 
here is to observe the commonality of these reforms rather than to opine on the wisdom 
of any of the proposals themselves.  
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Concluding that even broad war justifications can be 
stretched beyond all reason, some advocates and scholars have 
called for the repeal, amendment, or replacement of the AUMF.52 
The major premises underlying such reform proposals are that 
war justifications must be codified and reflect, as much as 
possible, cooperation between the political branches.53 On this 
view, a tenuous statutory authorization worsens the problem of 
spillover and exposes a war justification to charges that it is 
politically illegitimate, unconstitutional, or in violation of 
international law. 
C. RIFFS ON A CLASSIC: GAYS IN THE MILITARY, GAY 
MARRIAGE 
Now consider a variation on the war justification 
formulation, in a more far-reaching incarnation that actually 
helped to expand individual rights. On September 20, 2011, 
President Obama certified the end of the military’s “Don’t Ask, 
Don’t Tell” policy, which had barred gays and lesbians from 
serving their country openly. In his announcement, he cited not 
only the country’s longtime commitment to egalitarianism, but 
also a growing realization that the anti-gay policy “undermined 
our military readiness.” In this way, a war justification once again 
contained consequentialist arguments about effective warmaking 
relevant to a constitutional question. In this case, fighting a war 
more effectively encompassed pursuing the goal of a more 
expansive notion of equality for those engaged in the fighting. 
Sexual orientation should be stricken from the criteria for 
fitness to serve in the military, Obama insisted, with service itself 
to be treated as a valuable social good. According to the 
president, the nation’s fighting force should not be “deprived of 
the talents and skills of patriotic Americans” simply on the basis 
of their sexual preference, “especially with our nation at war”54—
 52. See, e.g., Robert Chesney et al., A Statutory Framework for Next-Generation 
Terrorist Threats, HOOVER INST. 2 (2013); Robert Golan-Vilella, Time to Narrow the 
AUMF, THE NAT’L INTEREST (Sept. 18, 2013), http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-
buzz/time-narrow-the-aumf-9082; Bruce Ackerman & Oona Hathaway, Limited War and 
the Constitution: Iraq and the Crisis of Presidential Legality, 109 MICH. L. REV. 447, 449 
(2011) (arguing that the war in Iraq exceeded the terms of AUMF). 
 53. The ideal of inter-branch cooperation over foreign affairs is powerfully stated in 
Robert Jackson’s concurring opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 
579 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 54. Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Sec’y, Statement by the 
President on Certification of Repeal of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell (July 22, 2011), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/07/22/statement-president-certification-
repeal-dont-ask-dont-tell.  
 
THREEARGUMENTSWAR_DRAFT 2 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/29/2014 3:02 PM 
2015] THREE ARGUMENTS ABOUT WAR 25 
an obvious allusion to ongoing military engagements. Obama’s 
presentation involved a textbook replay of Harry Truman’s 
arguments in support of desegregating the military on the basis of 
race. At both historical moments, a sitting President advanced 
equal protection of the law by arguing that the fact of ongoing 
military conflict itself tipped the scales in favor of the anti-
discrimination principle.55 According to the form of the argument, 
the demands of successfully waging war—acquiring resources, 
recruiting manpower, inculcating a sense of commitment and trust 
among soldiers—aligned with the promotion of racial equality. 
Treating sexual minorities the same as heterosexuals made the 
military more capable of meeting modern challenges. America’s 
fighting forces were stretched thin around the world. Notably, 
Obama pointed out that the change in policy ensured that 
patriotic Americans “will no longer have to lie about who they are 
in order to serve the country they love.” In this way, he drew upon 
an abiding traditionalist belief that an effective military required 
soldiers who were not only fierce warriors, but also honorable 
people. The exclusion of homosexuals from the armed forces 
distorted the very ideal of the citizen-soldier.56 
A few months later, President Obama described the 
evolution of his thinking that lead to his newfound public support 
for gay marriage. In an ABC interview, he said: 
I have to tell you that over the course of—several years, as I 
talked to friends and family and neighbors. . . . When I think 
about—those soldiers or airmen or marines or—sailors who 
are out there fighting on my behalf—and yet, feel constrained, 
even now that ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ is gone, because—
they’re not able to—commit themselves in a marriage. 
At a certain point I’ve just concluded that—for me personally, 
it is important for me to go ahead and affirm that—I think same 
sex couples should be able to get married.57 
 55. Exec. Order No. 9981, 3 C.F.R. 722 (1943-1948). 
 56. Senator Joseph Lieberman (I-CT) and Patrick Murphy (D-PA), who co-
sponsored the repeal legislation, echoed these themes: “It is our firm belief that it is time 
to repeal this discriminatory policy that not only dishonors those who are willing to give 
their lives in service to their country but also prevents capable men and women with vital 
skills from serving in the armed forces.” Michael D. Shear & Ed O’Keefe, Obama Backs 
‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ Compromise That Could Pave Way for Repeal, WASH. POST, May 
25, 2010, at A1. 
 57. Interview by Robin Roberts with President Obama (May 9, 2012), available at 
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/transcript-robin-roberts-abc-news-interview-president-
obama/story?id=16316043. For a critique of Obama’s personal tone in discussing gay  
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President Obama’s statement proved noteworthy in two 
respects. First, he drew on changed legal conditions—namely, the 
recent end to sexual orientation discrimination in military service. 
He bootstrapped the military service question into the one about 
marriage, implying that action on one front ineluctably leads to 
progress on the other. If one perceives the two issues as 
implicating essential rights and obligations of equal citizenship, 
then the idea that sexual equality applies in the military service 
suggests that the principle also has a strong claim of application in 
other domains of civic life. Second, he relied on ongoing, active 
military service—that the nation found itself in wartime—to 
justify equality in domestic life. The fact that “soldiers or airmen 
or marines or sailors . . . are out there fighting on my behalf” at 
that very moment was tendered as a reason to support gay 
marriage. 
His point was not to convey any personal feelings of guilt but 
rather his considered judgments on how war altered the very 
conditions for evaluating what equality required. The fact that gay 
soldiers were putting themselves in harm’s way, Obama, 
suggested, demanded a more searching inquiry by policymakers 
into the issues these soldiers hold dear. Third, this attitude drew 
upon an ancient linkage between civil equality and a citizen’s duty 
to defend the republic. In this neoclassical view (new because the 
rights to which citizens are entitled are treated as an open set), the 
duty to fight entails a reciprocal obligation of fair treatment on 
the part of the state towards the loyal subject of law. 
Still, there was one crucial area where the new war 
justification argument differed from the conventional form of the 
argument: the permanence of one’s legal ends. Note that the fact 
of war was not used to create an extraordinary legal outcome for 
gay rights, as with the internment cases, but rather to justify a 
permanent state in civil equality for sexual minorities.58 In other 
words, the fact of armed conflict (ordinarily understood as an 
exigent state) can be used to fashion legal principles that, going 
forward, will depend on no live war in the future for its legitimacy. 
Civil equality for gays and lesbians—in the military and in 
marriage, see Elliott Abrams, ‘On My Behalf,’ WEEKLY STANDARD, May 9, 2012, 
available at http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/my-behalf_644310.html. 
 58. Gay soldiers are certainly offered up as virtuous and deserving of autonomy and 
dignity, while in the internment cases, enemy aliens and those of Japanese ancestry 
(regardless of legal citizenship) are treated as imperfect citizens. So models of ideal 
citizenship, whether made explicit or latent in the debate, can and do influence 
constitutional debate.  
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matrimony—will not expire at the close of the latest war or 
international police action. One might find this a happy outcome 
because a war going on the time of decision was simply one of 
many reasons to support gay equality (and perhaps not even the 
most convincing one). It does, however, illustrate the malleability 
of war justifications, whose scope can be broadened to include 
everything from battle readiness to fairness for those who fight 
the nation’s wars. And it is fair, I think, to ask of a proponent of 
this argument: just how crucial is war to the debate over a legal 
change? Is war being invoked cynically or with good cause? 
Some might see little reason to worry. At first blush, the 
argument seems to admit of inherent limitations: it is most 
forceful when one is talking about the people engaged in 
warmaking, activities associated with those efforts, and resources 
involved. But we eventually have to face the question that looms 
over every allocation of rights and other valuable social goods, at 
least from the standpoint of equality: why for some but not for 
others? If soldiers are entitled to certain rights because of their 
sacrificial acts, why not civilians as well?59 War justification 
arguments may no longer be doing the analytical work when such 
a claim arises, but there is no denying they might have altered the 
conditions in which later arguments are evaluated. 
IV. WAR LEGACY: VALUES, PRINCIPLES, EVENTS 
At times, certain ideas, principles, frameworks, or events 
associated with specific wars may be drawn upon to support a 
desired interpretation of the Constitution. Collateral claims about 
the normative significance of a war are best understood as war 
legacy arguments. Consider President Obama’s September 25, 
2012, speech before the United Nations, in which he addressed 
the anti-Islamic YouTube video that helped spark anti-American 
demonstrations and violence around the world. At the same time 
he denounced the slander of the prophet Muhammad, he also 
extolled the principle of free speech. Taking a page from FDR’s 
playbook,60 President Obama stressed that “Americans have 
fought and died around the globe to protect the right of all people 
to express their views, even views that we profoundly disagree 
 59. Or as Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 438 (1972), famously posed: if there is a 
right to contraceptives for marrieds, why not for singles as well? 
 60. FDR was the first modern president to make prominent war legacy arguments to 
elevate the importance of First Amendment rights. See generally Tsai, Reconsidering 
Gobitis, supra note 27.  
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with.” The fact that lives had been sacrificed in the armed defense 
of freedom of expression served several goals. First, he 
established free speech as essential to the survival of “true 
democracy” (rather than some facsimile of self-government). 
Second, he suggested that worldwide sacrifice justified the trans-
border reach of a principle sometimes thought to be an indulgence 
among Western countries. Third, his speech tried to foster an 
ethic of rights foundationalism—a sense that the state is obligated 
to protect some core of individual rights, perhaps because such 
rights even preexist the state. Obama then moved from discussing 
the armed defense of rights on the battlefield (in the past) toward 
the need to remain vigilant (today) to protect “the capacity of 
each individual to express their own views and practice their own 
faith” wherever that “threat” exists—“for our own people and for 
people all across the world.” 
Unlike arguments deploying a live war as a general 
justification, which contain a presentist structure (whose future 
implications should be taken into account only later), war legacy 
arguments are simultaneously forward-looking and backward-
looking. The past is interrogated to fashion a coherent vision for 
the future, such that a synthesis of T1 and T3 will tell us how to live 
our lives in the here and now (T2). As an argument, it is free to be 
ambitious while the general formulation must be constrained by 
exigency. What is important to the proponent is that the 
anticipated conclusion of a war presents the opportunity for 
reflection on the meaning of a war and the implementation of 
newfound legal commitments. 
For the most part, scholars have generally overlooked the 
prevalence and internal structure of war legacy arguments.61 
Phillip Bobbitt, for example, has identified only six legitimate 
constitutional arguments, and war legacy arguments do not neatly 
fit into any of them.62 Those who have observed how the role that 
 61. For some exceptions to this trend, see supra text accompanying note 27. 
 62. See BOBBITT, supra note 9. Bobbitt identifies only six types of constitutional 
arguments: textual, historical, structural, ethical, doctrinal, and prudential. A war legacy 
argument, depending on how it is constructed, might be sandwiched in the historical 
category (to the extent it references a particular event), the ethical category (by invoking 
a war-inspired principle), or the prudential one (underscoring certain benefits from 
offering a war-inspired interpretation). But the better view is that most war legacy claims 
straddle the historical-ethical categories. Jack Balkin’s theory of living originalism permits 
consideration of “narrative understandings of the trajectory and meaning of national 
history,” and one might treat reference to America’s collective war experience to fit this 
category. See BALKIN, supra note 5 at 256. Yet Balkin himself does not spend time 
analyzing whether war is a legitimate feature of narrative arguments; nor does he wrestle 
with the inherent difficulties of war dependent arguments.  
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war can play in arguments often miss the ways in which war legacy 
arguments resemble or depart from more established 
constitutional arguments. 
War legacy arguments are a hybrid of historical and ethical 
arguments. They resemble historical arguments in that they draw 
upon some historical occurrence, but they are not strictly 
“originalist” in the sense that they must be confined to a singular 
moment of legal creation (say, 1789) or tethered to a particular 
act of legal writing. A legal actor might draw on the Revolutionary 
War, certainly (in which case the war legacy claim can accompany 
more traditional originalist arguments), but she might just as well 
draw upon the Civil War, the Great War, or World War II as 
armed conflicts yielding important legal principles. When this 
happens, a war’s aftermath is presented as a moment of 
constitutional creativity. By focusing more on grand substantive 
principles, rather than the specific intentions of draftsmen, war 
legacy arguments mirror traditional ethical arguments about the 
purpose or function of a constitution. 
All war legacy arguments rest on the assumptions that wars 
can and should operate as engines for the production of normative 
principles. Wisely or not, such arguments insist that a sufficient 
degree of democratic reflection and shared sacrifice during 
wartime can generate something akin to popular consent for legal 
change. Some of these assumptions could be factually incorrect 
upon empirical testing, of course, but nevertheless all war legacy 
claims presume that a desirable degree of deliberation and 
consensus is theoretically possible. These legal principles might be 
already inscribed elsewhere at a high level of abstraction, as in the 
case with Lincoln’s plea on behalf of racial equality (i.e., the 
Declaration of Independence states that “all men are created 
equal”). But many war legacy claims are not articulated with any 
degree of certitude, or even in any single place, leading to inherent 
difficulties in evaluating the claim of democratic consent implicit 
in a war-dependent argument and the proper scope of a war-
derived principle. 
A. EXAMPLES OF WAR LEGACY ARGUMENTS 
1. Lincoln and Racial Equality 
One of the most famous instances of war legacy arguments 
can be found in Abraham Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address. It 
occurred after decisive battlefield developments—Robert E. Lee 
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attempted a second invasion of the North but suffered such 
extensive losses that he was forced to retreat. Symbolically, after 
the bloodiest battle of the Civil War, the North believed the 
outcome to be a sign of impending victory. Even before there was 
any serious debate over the content of formal amendments to the 
Constitution, or even a formal end to hostilities, Lincoln laid the 
groundwork for major constitutional change. At the dedication of 
a cemetery at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, he linked the Founding, 
which he called the birth of “a new nation, conceived in Liberty, 
and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal,” 
with the war sacrifices of the Civil War armies.63 Lincoln invoked 
the glorious dead, “those who here gave their lives so that that 
nation might live.”64 Instead of merely recognizing a past event, 
he urged listeners—“the living”—to join him in “unfinished 
work”: erecting a more permanent memorial to honor those who 
fought, “a new birth of freedom.”65 Thus sanctified, the war would 
gain the power to remake the legal order. 
Looking ahead, the main legacy of the Civil War would have 
to be stable government dedicated to equality for all. Issued some 
ten months after the Emancipation Proclamation, the Gettysburg 
Address can be understood as an effort to pivot from fighting the 
war to rebuilding the legal order. Issued pursuant to his 
Commander in Chief authority over the field of war, the 
Proclamation’s nascent assertions of racial equality needed 
sounder footing to survive. Initially, slaves were treated as 
“captives of war,” with their war-time freedom resting on 
Lincoln’s assertion of exigent powers to fight the seceding states 
as insurrectionists. But the Proclamation also made a forward-
looking promise that liberated slaves “shall be forever free of 
their servitude and not again held as slaves.” Could such a 
promise be kept? Only some lasting codification of war-inspired 
principles could fulfill this commitment, especially if orderly 
reintegration of the defeated states, too, was a priority. The 
Gettysburg Address can thus be considered an exercise in war 
constitutionalism, with the entrenchment of new constitutional 
principles begun through public oration and popular texts (e.g., 
newspaper coverage and editorials). Indeed, the Chicago Daily 
Tribune expressed confidence that the President’s remarks “will 
 63. Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id.  
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live among the annals of man.”66 To be sure, speeches can begin, 
but not end in new constitutional commitments. Such sentiments 
must ultimately be codified in some authoritative legal writing. 
Lincoln would not live long enough to finish that work, but his 
appeal to building a war legacy initiated the constitutional 
process. 
2. Truman on the Right to Healthcare 
Similarly, consider Truman’s speeches in the fall of 1945, 
upon Japan’s sudden surrender. On September 6, 1945, Truman 
congratulated Congress for its hard work and then pivoted to 
another “great emergency” requiring “the same energy, foresight, 
and wisdom as we did in carrying on the way and winning this 
victory.”67 The reconstructive program he outlined included not 
only the demobilization of the military and the relaxation of 
economic controls, but also the advancement of an “Economic 
Bill of Rights” first articulated by FDR. That list included “the 
right to adequate medical care and the opportunity to achieve and 
enjoy good health.”68 Throughout, Truman argued that these 
rights were the fruits of the American people’s labors during the 
war. “In this hour of victory over our enemies abroad,” he urged 
listeners “to use all our efforts to build a better life here at home 
and a better world for generations to come” by elaborating these 
rights.69 Two months later, Truman recast the right to health care 
as a universal right. “Our new Economic Bill of Rights should be 
mean health security for all,” he insisted, “regardless of residence, 
station, or race—everywhere in the United States.”70 
To be sure, like other affirmative rights, much would depend 
on the precise services, legal entitlements, and enforcement 
mechanisms created. But at the conceptual level and the level of 
dialogic mechanics, at least, we have all the hallmarks of war 
 66. See Editorial, Lincoln at Gettysburg, 150 Years Later, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 19, 2013, 
available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-11-19/opinion/ct-lincoln-gettysburg-
edit-1119-20131119_1_gettysburg-address-150-years-speech. 
 67. President Harry S. Truman, Special Message to the Congress Presenting a 21-
Point Program for the Reconversion Period (Sept. 6, 1945), available at 
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=136&st=&st1=. 
 68. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to the Congress of the United States 
on the State of the Union (Jan. 11, 1944), available at http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu
/archives/address_text.html. 
 69. See supra note 67. 
 70. President Harry S. Truman, Special Message to the Congress Recommending a 
Comprehensive Health Program (Nov. 19, 1945), available at http://www.trumanlibrary.
org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=483.  
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constitutionalism through presidential leadership: the president 
has proposed the establishment of a fundamental right and made 
the case for the right in part by arguing that post-war 
reconstruction efforts require its legal development. The method 
of implementing these constitutional changes remained uncertain: 
the right to “health security” at this stage sounded like one that 
will have to be fashioned legislatively, but it also could be taken 
as an invitation to judicial creativity in sketching such a right. And 
by linking the welfare of individuals and their families to the 
security of the nation as a whole, Truman claimed that affordable 
health care implicates a president’s duty as Commander in Chief. 
Truman may only have been setting an agenda at this point, but 
by invoking rights-based rhetoric, he laid a foundation for later 
presidential interventions on this issue. 
3. Judicial Decisions Resorting to War Legacy Arguments 
A noteworthy war-inspired decision can be found in 
Chambers v. Florida,71 where Hugo Black threw out the 
Due Process Clause with an eye toward the European 
conflict, he wrote: “Tyrannical governments had immemorially 
utilized dictatorial criminal procedure and punishment to make 
scapegoats of the weak, or of helpless religious, or confessions of 
several black youths interrogated over the course of several 
days with little rest and no access to assistance. Reading 
racial minorities and those who differed, who would not conform 
and who resisted tyranny. . . . Today, as in ages past, we are not 
without tragic proof that the exalted power of some governments 
to punish manufactured crime dictatorially is the handmaid of 
tyranny”72 Importantly, a desire to fight a live war more effectively 
was not presented as the reason for acting. Rather, the High Court 
developed certain ideas associated with a widening global conflict 
against authoritarian governments—individual dignity, anti-
discrimination, open and fair process—to help explain why these 
convictions must be overturned. 
Because the U.S. was not formally fighting the war yet, the 
case dramatizes the malleability of the war legacy argument. Mere 
anticipated involvement or association with a democratic nation 
at war can be enough to make a credible war legacy argument 
credible. 
 71.  309 U.S. 227 (1940). 
 72. Id. at 236, 241 (italics added).  
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An example of the war legacy argument after American 
participation in the war can be found in Kotteakos v. United 
States.73 Today, Kotteakos is remembered as a criminal procedure 
decision clarifying the “harmless error” standard. In its own time, 
it amounted to a work of war constitutionalism. The question 
presented in 1946 was whether defendants in a criminal 
conspiracy trial suffered substantial prejudice from being 
convicted during a single trial. Many differences between the 
defendants turned up during trial, and only a common figure tied 
the defendants together. Writing for the majority, Justice 
Rutledge reversed. Throughout the opinion, he stressed the 
virtues of individualized justice over the democratic failures of 
“mass trial.” Although participants to a conspiracy to some extent 
“invite mass trial by their conduct,” nevertheless “the proceedings 
are exceptional to our tradition and call for use of every safeguard 
to individualize each defendant in his relation to the mass.”74 
The Supreme Court stopped short of relying on the Sixth 
Amendment, but made clear that its reading of relevant criminal 
procedure statutes and precedents was intended to do substantive 
justice and prevent “miscarriage of justice.”75 Just in case the 
casual reader missed the reference to Nazi and Soviet methods, 
Justice Rutledge added several sentences explaining why 
exposing ordinary criminals to a single unruly trial violated the 
lessons of World War II as well as the precepts of the emerging 
Cold War order: 
Criminal they may be, but it is not the criminality of mass 
conspiracy. They do not invite mass trial by their conduct. Nor 
does our system tolerate it. That way lies the drift toward 
totalitarian institutions. True, this may be convenient for 
prosecution. But our Government is not one of mere 
convenience or efficiency. It too has a stake, with every citizen, 
in his being afforded our historic individual protections, 
including those surrounding criminal trials. About them we 
dare not become careless or complacent when that fashion has 
become rampant over the earth.76 
 73. 328 U.S. 750 (1946). 
 74. Id. at 773. 
 75. Id. at 776; see also id. at 760 (analyzing how criminal procedure is intended to 
“preserve review as a check upon arbitrary action and essential unfairness in trials, but at 
the same time to make the process perform that function without giving men fairly 
convicted the multiplicity of loopholes which any highly rigid and minutely detailed 
scheme of errors, especially in relation to procedure, will engender and reflect in a printed 
record”). 
 76. Id. at 773.  
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The Justices gave two principles a new gloss through the 
experience of armed conflict: equal dignity and deliberation. The 
first principle was underscored by the Justices’ frequent mention 
of the “individual and personal,” the “stake” of “every citizen,” 
and one’s “identity” separate from the “mass.” The second 
principle, related to the first, may be extracted from the Justices’ 
suggestion that a jury’s ability to deliberate in a way that satisfies 
democratic standards may be at odds with “convenience,” 
“efficiency,” or “fashion.” 
By measuring the government’s conduct against such ideals, 
it was said that Americans could distinguish themselves from 
peoples who depend on “totalitarian institutions.” The entire 
comparison rested on the assumption that the war was being 
fought for a democratic legacy, one that judges ought to not 
merely acknowledge but also purposefully incorporate into the 
law as principles, concepts, and categories. The field of action had 
so broadened that a jurist, as much as the elected official, should 
be understood to be resisting an anti-democratic “fashion that has 
become rampant over the earth.” Kotteakos concluded by issuing 
this war-inspired command: 
Here, if anywhere, . . . extraordinary precaution is required, not 
only that instructions shall not mislead, but that they shall 
scrupulously safeguard each defendant individually, as far as 
possible, from loss of identity in the mass.77 
For the Kotteakos Court, the principal dangers to be avoided 
encompassed not only substantive injustice, but also dignitary 
interests that are harder to quantify: a loss of personality brought 
about by a faceless, nameless treatment by the state.78 Destruction 
of the self through a flawed legal process can be understood in 
terms of how the individual feels about herself after being 
subjected to such impersonal treatment, but it can also refer to a 
general perception among the population at large that the state 
 77. Id. at 776 (italics added). Justice Douglas’s dissent tackles this charge not by 
disagreeing with the characterization of mass trials, but merely arguing that the facts do 
not warrant such a finding: 
On the record no implication of guilt by reason of a mass trial can be found. The 
dangers which petitioners conjure up are abstract ones. Moreover, the true 
picture of the case is not thirty-two defendants engaging in eight or more different 
conspiracies which were lumped together as one. The jury convicted only four 
persons in addition to petitioners. The other defendants and the evidence 
concerning them were in effect eliminated from the case. 
Id. at 777–78. Thus, we sense that some broader terrain has shifted because the “abstract” 
dangers themselves are not considered outlandish. 
 78. Here, the injury comes about because of a curable procedural defect, whereas in 
other situations, such a “loss of personality” may not be so easily remedied.  
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has behaved in an unduly coercive fashion. If there was no longer 
a hot war in 1946, there remained a continuing war by proxy over 
foundational ideas. 
Kotteakos illustrates both the strengths and pitfalls of this 
approach to interpretation. There is both a past and ongoing 
feature to the Justices’ invocation of war legacy arguments, as the 
lessons of World War II are uncomfortably merged with more 
pressing concerns about constructing an enduring war legacy for 
Americans fighting the Cold War. More specific experiences of 
battling Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and Imperial Japan have 
become an imperative to wage ideological war against 
“totalitarianism” more broadly. One set of objections sound in the 
breadth and ambiguity of this principle: just what is meant by 
adopting an anti-authoritarian approach to the Constitution?79 To 
be sure, legal principles are often open-ended (see “equal 
protection of the law”). The difference, here, though, is that anti-
totalitarianism as an idea can cut across any number of doctrinal 
boundaries, with the potential for dramatically remaking past 
legal limits. Are trial rights the only ones that can be appropriately 
characterized as implicating America’s war legacy or can other 
procedural rules be so described? 
In Kotteakos, anti-totalitarianism appears as some set of 
procedural values and the dignitary interests that are fostered by 
following protocol. Justice Rutledge’s opinion resonates precisely 
because of the mass trials and show trials conducted by the Nazis 
and Soviets that horrified so many Americans. In other words, 
there is a plausible (if not perfect) fit between one historical event 
and a pending legal problem. There were, in fact, procedurally 
flawed forms of justice being meted out by other countries. 
Because the American Constitution is ideologically and culturally 
distinctive, our legal practices must reflect this distinctiveness. 
Note that the argument is not that America is an authoritarian 
regime, but that certain kinds of behavior can be seen as 
totalitarian. American courts both honor our war experience and 
 79. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737 (1989) 
(proposing an anti-totalitarian approach to abortion). On the other hand, opponents of 
abortion have likened the right to abortion to slavery. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. 
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 984 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring & dissenting in part); Laura 
Vozzella, Dems Blast Comparison of Slavery, Abortion, WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 2013, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/va-politics/dems-blast-comparison-of-slavery-
abortion/2013/03/19/b4eea6b2-909d-11e2-9abd-e4c5c9dc5e90_story.html. See generally 
Jamin B. Raskin, Roe v. Wade and the Dred Scott Decision: Justice Scalia’s Peculiar 
Analogy in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 1 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 61 (1993).  
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fulfill the ethical facet of constitutionalism by embracing well- 
founded war legacy arguments. 
A significant part of modern First Amendment law can be 
traced to war constitutionalism. At times, concerns about an 
impending or ongoing war led jurists to circumscribe civil 
liberties. On other occasions, however, a desire to create a rule of 
law legacy for a particular war led judges to favor enhanced 
protections for the rights of speech, assembly, or religion. This 
occurred most dramatically in a series of lawsuits in the post-war 
period. The lessons of World War II quickly merged with the Cold 
War imperative. During this formative era, not everyone agreed 
that legacy should favor the radical speaker. Robert Jackson and 
Felix Frankfurter were among the most passionate proponents of 
the view that a commitment to anti-totalitarianism as a 
constitutional value occasionally means that certain speakers 
should be silenced to protect democracy itself. For instance, 
Beauharnais v. Illinois80 upheld a group libel law. Justice 
Frankfurter not only rested the decision on the notion that 
individual libel was unprotected speech, he also tried to show how 
the war effort justified this outcome. He wrote: “Illinois did not 
have to look beyond her own borders or await the tragic 
experience of the last three decades to conclude that willful 
purveyors of falsehood concerning racial and religious groups 
promote strife and tend powerfully to obstruct . . . free, ordered 
life in a metropolitan, polyglot community,”81 and cited such 
publications as Loewenstein, Legislative Control of Political 
Extremism in European Democracies82 and Riesman, Democracy 
and Defamation.83 
Robert Jackson made a similar, though unsuccessful attempt, 
to make a legacy-of-war argument in Terminiello v. Chicago84 
when he urged readers to consider “recent European history.” In 
that case, an individual espousing anti-Semitic and anti-
 80. 343 U.S. 250 (1952). Beauharnais has never been overruled, though the Supreme 
Court has had opportunities to do so. It does stand in tension with more expansive pro-
speech rulings since 1952. 
 81. Id. at 258–59 (citation omitted). 
 82. See Karl Loewenstein, Legislative Control of Political Extremism in European 
Democracies I, 38 COLUM. L. REV. 591, 725 (1938). 
 83. See David Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Control of Group Libel, 42 
COLUM. L. REV. 727, 1085, 1282 (1942). That this was understood as an exercise in war 
constitutionalism is attested by Justice Douglas, who despite his difference of opinion on 
the ultimate question nevertheless acknowledges that “Hitler and his Nazis showed how 
evil a conspiracy could be which was aimed at destroying a race by exposing it to contempt, 
derision, and obloquy.” Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 284 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 84. 337 U.S. 1 (1949).  
 
THREEARGUMENTSWAR_DRAFT 2 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/29/2014 3:02 PM 
2015] THREE ARGUMENTS ABOUT WAR 37 
Communist views before an unruly crowd was arrested for breach 
of the peace. The Supreme Court overturned the conviction on 
free speech grounds, but Justice Jackson dissented. He pointed 
out that “mastery of the streets by either radical or reactionary 
mob” became “a tragic reality” through Hitler’s demagoguery.85 
The fact that revolutionary and racist ideology had “devastated 
Europe” gave a strong reason for interdicting such speech in 
America; those espousing such beliefs in the streets represented 
“totalitarian groups” seeking to “undermine the prestige and 
effectiveness of local democratic governments.”86 The rest of the 
Justices disagreed. Written by William O. Douglas, the majority 
opinion opted for the rights-protective version of America’s war 
legacy: “The right to speak freely and to promote diversity of 
ideas and programs is . . . one of the chief distinctions that sets us 
apart from totalitarian regimes.”87 Having difficulty drawing lines 
between dangerous anti-democratic propaganda and merely 
controversial political speech, the Court chose the maximalist 
liberty position. 
Likewise, in Kunz v. New York,88 a street preacher prevailed, 
but only over a withering dissent by Justice Jackson. Jackson’s 
dissent once again offered a vision of the First Amendment 
marked by war. The Baptist minister saw his speech permit 
revoked based on his repeated public denunciations of various 
religious beliefs. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Vinson’s 
decision found that municipal permit regulations lacked sufficient 
standards. In dissent, Jackson favored restricting religiously 
inflammatory speech in part because “Jews, many of whose 
families perished in extermination furnaces of Dachau and 
Auschwitz,” would surely find immediate offense when they are 
described as “Christ-killers.”89 He argued for the incorporation of 
Europe’s historical-ethical lesson as part of America’s own. 
Jackson’s implication: one of the lessons of the recent global war 
was that racist or anti-Semitic expression not only fails to 
contribute meaningfully to public debate but also foments illiberal 
agendas. At some point, the nation-state is entitled to interdict 
such speech in the name of self-preservation. The key, for our 
purposes, is that Justice Jackson’s argument in Kunz, as in 
 85. Id. at 24 (Jackson, J., dissenting). At another point in his dissent, Jackson quoted 
Goebbels to the effect that Nazism arose by taking advantage of overly naïve democratic 
practices. See id. at 35. 
 86. Id. at 24. 
 87. Id. at 4. 
 88. 340 U.S. 290 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 89. Id. at 299.  
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Terminiello, makes sense only when the First Amendment is 
authoritatively interpreted through America’s war experience. 
Decades later, the Supreme Court upheld the right of public 
schoolchildren to express their opposition to the Vietnam War by 
wearing black armbands.90 Like Justice Frankfurter’s original 
opinion in Gobitis, school officials raised the fact of a raging war 
in Vietnam as a reason for silencing the students to foster social 
unity.91 But Justice Fortas’s opinion in Tinker rejected the war 
justification rationale, instead grounding the pro-speech decision 
in America’s war legacy. The mere fact of the ongoing struggle in 
Southeast Asia was not enough to curtail freedom of expression, 
the High Court concluded, unless the students’ own behavior 
posed a “material and substantial” risk of disturbance. Public 
schools “may not be enclaves of totalitarianism,” Justice Fortas 
wrote, invoking one of the political lessons of World War II and 
the resulting Cold War. The frightening image of Nazi and Soviet 
mind control through legalized propaganda shaped the Court’s 
interpretation of the First Amendment. American school officials 
simply could not enjoy “absolute authority” over students, who 
should be treated as rights-bearing persons rather than “closed-
circuit recipients of only that which the State chooses to 
communicate.” In that instance, America’s war legacy triumphed 
over the exigencies cited in waging the Vietnam conflict. 
B. RULE OF LAW CONCERNS 
In many ways, war legacy arguments combine the best and 
worst of historical and ethical arguments. Substantively, they are 
open-ended enough that conservatives and liberals who accept 
the idea of a living constitution find the interpretive approach 
difficult to resist. Yet the collective indulgence shown such 
arguments and the intrinsic pliability of the argument creates 
recurring interpretive problems. 
Transparency is one concern with war legacy claims. 
Compared to arguments in which war figures as a general 
justification, these moves can be harder to discern. First, the tactic 
assumes social and historical knowledge on the part of other 
actors. Without some awareness of certain brute historical facts, 
 90. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 91. In enacting the no-armband policy, the School Board had cited “[t]he Viet Nam 
war and the involvement of the United States therein has been the subject of a major 
controversy for some time. When the armband regulation involved herein was 
promulgated, debate over the Viet Nam war had become vehement in many localities.” Id. 
at 510 n.4.  
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this form of war constitutionalism is nonsensical, not to mention 
unpersuasive. This risk of unintelligibility (as well as reduced 
persuasiveness) increases over time as the generation that fought 
a war dies out, replaced by individuals who paid no tangible price 
in that conflict (discounted by official and non-official efforts to 
control historical memory in this regard). Second, arguing over 
the legacy of a war assumes sufficient social agreement when in 
fact the lessons of war may be poorly established or polarizing. 
Third, insofar as a consensus view may exist,92 an appeal to 
consensus about the legacy of a particular war may be casual, 
oblique, or incomplete. 
Concerns about democratic accountability also lurk. War 
legacy claims that traverse institutions in a relatively orderly 
fashion and are widely disseminated might have some claim on 
popular approval, but more obscure or isolated war legacy claims 
could reflect nothing more than ruminations by elites. War legacy 
arguments, like any war-dependent modality, can be resisted (as 
the Gobitis to Barnette episode shows), but the question remains: 
how easily? 
Significant challenges can arise in determining the proper 
scope of a war-derived legal principle. Some claims to advance the 
anti-totalitarian ethic surely won’t be plausible. If, for example, 
one claims “totalitarianism” in a way that makes no obvious 
reference to an analogous historical event or practice, the 
argument runs the risk of severing the historical-ethical link at the 
heart of the approach. Overly broad appeals to war legacy 
arguments can, I think, be rebuffed on such grounds. So, too, one 
can resist a war legacy argument by undermining the historical 
component of the argument: e.g., no totalitarian regime actually 
did X, the war was not really about Y, and so on. 
Choosing which war experience to privilege, and what legal 
lessons to draw from the wars that matter, has indubitably shaped 
the meaning of the American Constitution. But are such 
interpretations truly lasting? Much of the initial power of appeals 
to the Second World War, and the Cold War that followed, can 
be understood as generational. In fact, sometimes such arguments 
collapse into thinly-veiled suggestions that the generation that 
fought the good fight has special insight into the mysterious 
meanings of the U.S. Constitution. 
 92. There may be reasons to think that the lessons of some conflicts, such as World 
War II, have generated greater consensus, while others, such as Korea or Vietnam, have 
yielded a more scattered and divisive lessons.  
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Consider John Paul Stevens’s statement in Young v. 
American Mini Theaters that “few of us would march our sons and 
daughters off to war” in order to ensure the availability of 
pornography or the right to engage in public nudity.93 Pointing not 
to any particular war but rather America’s collective war 
experience, he suggests that certain legal controversies—and the 
perspectives offered to justify those positions—are trivial 
compared to the noble wartimes sacrifices of the many. Justice 
Stevens (who served in the Navy during World War II) does not 
elaborate what, precisely, a war legacy could be, but instead insists 
that, whatever it is, it is not about sexual liberty of this sort. To 
wax lyrical about the right to view nudity is to cast shame on the 
actual wartime sacrifices of those who gave their all. This kind of 
war legacy argument may seem patently unfair, as most every 
matter pales in comparison to wartime sacrifice. It may be doubly 
troubling to mention the honorable dead as a reason for decision 
when no war is even remotely involved in the controversy at hand. 
Even so, Justice Stevens seems to be implying that ideas about 
sexual liberty are beyond the ambit of any reasonable war legacy 
argument. If that is so, he simply fails to offer any reason why 
repression of sexual ideas cannot be captured by the ethic of anti-
totalitarianism. This is why his conclusory statement is 
objectionable, and can be read as an officer pulling rank. 
Worth noting, too, is that once such a war-dependent 
argument is made, however poorly, it can be repeated as 
persuasive authority. Justice O’Connor, a quarter century later, 
adapted Justice Stevens’s war argument in a nude dancing case.94 
It is hard to know for certain, but perhaps she felt emboldened to 
pronounce on the Second World War’s legacy once her senior 
colleague and member of the Greatest Generation did so. 
V. WAR AS A METAPHOR 
When war is deployed as a metaphor in legal discourse, it 
does more creative, and sometimes nefarious, constitutive work. 
Unlike the war as justification formulation, which subjects itself 
to the rule of reason, a war metaphor retains its vitality and utility 
by remaining deliberately vague. Unlike the war justification, the 
metaphor is unmoored from the foundational principle of self-
defense, as that concept plays no necessary part of the analysis; 
when it is unleashed, there is merely a gesture toward the need for 
 93. 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976) (plurality). 
 94. City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 294 (2000).  
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immediate, collective action. Nor do speakers feel that a war 
metaphor must be authorized by a particular deliberative moment 
or activity, as with the war legacy argument. Thus, the war 
metaphor is entirely unconstrained by legal principle or even the 
terms of historical evaluation. 
Each time the policy issue-as-war formulation has entered 
public debate, few actually believed Americans faced armed 
hostilities. The metaphor is thus dependent on war in a very 
different sense than the other forms of the argument. Instead of a 
live war, the pitch has worked by drawing on the more general 
connotations of war. But these connotations nevertheless proved 
to be invaluable for winning elections, altering mindsets, 
reordering priorities, altering institutional arrangements, and 
reshaping the law. To a large extent, legal transformations in the 
name of fighting a metaphorical war have occurred in the 
domestic sphere. Structurally, the war metaphor depends on 
already well-established cultural attitudes and cognitive pathways 
that rationalize vigorous governmental activity, high resource and 
human costs, and other kinds of collective sacrifice. But the major 
shift is that such frames of understanding and legal doctrines, once 
created with external threats in mind, are now harnessed for 
perceived internal threats to law and order. 
In terms of ambition, the metaphor’s order-remaking 
potential is on a different scale altogether. The “war on X” 
formula assumed most visible form in Lyndon B. Johnson’s “War 
on Poverty,” Nixon’s “War on Crime,” Reagan’s “War on Drugs,” 
Patrick Buchanan’s “Culture War,” and George W. Bush’s “War 
on Terror.” On each occasion, political leaders sought to improve 
their party’s standing with the electorate, knit new 
intergenerational coalitions and pursue a different combination of 
national policies. It is no accident, moreover, that such war-
inflected arguments were frequently launched as an assertion of 
leadership by presidents and aspirants to that office. These 
rhetorical performances then impacted the development of 
constitutional law. 
Legal limits previously deemed essential may be put under 
severe duress by a barrage of war metaphors. For instance, under 
conditions of ordinary politics there may be excellent reasons for 
narrow agendas and separate agency functions, but the pressure 
to coordinate may erode rule-of-law safeguards and distinctive 
institutional functions. Linguists have observed that a destructive 
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metaphor “hides reality in a harmful way.”95 Used to describe 
public policies matters, the war metaphor typically obscures more 
of the salient issues than it illuminates. If the war legacy argument 
is characterized by the problem of popular consent, then the war 
metaphor magnifies that concern through a lack of transparency. 
It mobilizes without bothering with a full accounting of costs, 
benefits, or moral considerations. Uncertainty over the nature 
and scope of a problem can lead not only to mission creep but also 
difficulty in evaluating ends and means. 
War metaphors also frequently raise a concern about 
commensurability. For the argument to work, they imply that 
comparisons between large-scale social problems are possible and 
appropriate. But to what extent is the problem of poverty or drug 
dependence really like the problem of war? Surely much depends 
on assumptions left unsaid: whether one believes, for example, 
that the causes for such problems lie in man’s nature (selfish or 
violent), or a particular ideology (radical Islam, capitalism), or 
environmental factors (politics, economic conditions, events). 
Further, war metaphors presume that incommensurable 
phenomena require roughly the same solutions: massive 
harnessing of governmental resources, the expansion of the law, 
any and all means that might be adapted to conquering the enemy. 
One further problem is worth taking seriously: It is possible 
that other types of successful war-dependent arguments “prime” 
citizens for this more aggressive and open-ended form of war talk. 
If so, normative approaches must take into account the possibility 
that war-dependent arguments can be layered in ways that can 
become difficult to untangle and expose to the rule of reason. 
A. HISTORICAL EXAMPLES 
1. War on Poverty 
On March 16, 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson gave a 
State of the Union Address adopting a militaristic attitude toward 
a domestic problem: “This administration today, here and now, 
declares unconditional war on poverty in America.”96 His explicit 
intentions entailed mobilizing “Congress and all Americans” to 
support federal intervention in problems that might otherwise be 
 95. See George Lakoff, Metaphor and War: The Metaphor System Used to Justify 
War in the Gulf (Jan. 1, 1991) (paper on file with author). 
 96. President Lyndon B. Johnson, Annual Message to the Congress on the State of 
the Union (Jan. 8, 1964), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=26787.  
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treated as state or local concerns. The fight against poverty would 
not be limited to legislative achievements in Washington, LBJ 
argued, but rather “must be won in the field, in every private 
home, in every public office, from the courthouse to the White 
House.”97 
President Johnson needed volunteers, job training programs, 
loans, programming. He found war-speak attractive to convey a 
long-term struggle necessitating flexible tactics: “It will not be a 
short or easy struggle, no single weapon or strategy will suffice.”98 
Like a live battle against an external enemy, the forces of poverty 
could only be eradicated through tireless efforts, with no 
American resting “until that war is won.” Our “chief weapons in 
a more pinpointed attack will be better schools, and better health, 
and better homes, and better training, and better job 
opportunities to help more Americans.”99 A National Service 
Corps, expanded food stamp program, minimum wage law, job 
training, anti-discrimination laws were appropriate measures—
even tax cuts and foreign aid. 
For LBJ, the formulation of “all-out war on human poverty 
and unemployment in these United States” had the benefit of 
drawing together policy issues typically treated as separate 
projects.100 The anti-poverty program was aimed at those who 
“live on the outskirts of hope—some because of their poverty, and 
some because of their color, and all too many because of both.”101 
Economic blight and strained race relations could be attacked 
together, with funding disbursed to an array of programs that 
could make headway on both goals. Importantly, the language of 
war also knit together disparate constituencies Democrats feared 
losing over its embrace of racial egalitarianism. LBJ spoke of 
reaching “chronically distressed areas of Appalachia” as well as 
“city slums.” Federal policy would help “sharecropper shacks or 
in migrant worker camps, on Indian Reservations, among whites 
as well as Negroes, among the young as well as the aged, in the 
boom towns and in the depressed areas.”102 Even so, the programs 
were “not for the poor or underprivileged alone,” but benefited 
“all Americans.” LBJ then seamlessly moved to military and 
foreign spending, characterizing “food as an instrument of 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id.  
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peace.”103 External enemies and international problems must be 
addressed to “frustrate those who prey on poverty and chaos.” 
Toward the end of his speech, one could detect a flash of 
recognition that this global war against poverty would be different 
from fighting a live war. The President’s use of the war metaphor 
was more about mobilizing people and resources, and effectuating 
legal change than vanquishing actual enemies of the state. He 
admitted that the causes of poverty are multifarious and not easy 
to identify and defeat. “We shall neither act as aggressors nor 
tolerate acts of aggression,” LBJ stated. “We intend to bury no 
one, and we do not intend to be buried.”104 But the ends of war, 
metaphorical or real, were supposedly one and the same: peace 
and stability. “We can fight, if we must, as we have fought before, 
but we pray that we will never have to fight again.”105 
At one moment in his speech, LBJ made a war legacy 
argument in favor of anti-discrimination laws, drawing on 
previous foreign conflicts. He noted: “Today, Americans of all 
races stand side by side in Berlin and in Viet Nam. They died side 
by side in Korea. Surely they can work and eat and travel side by 
side in their own country.”106 In that moment, he tied together not 
only memories of successful just wars like World War II, but also 
more contested military conflicts in Korea and Vietnam against 
the spread of Communism. The ease with which LBJ glided from 
issue to issue, and from live wars in the past to his proposed 
metaphorical war in the present shows the layered quality of 
constitutional discourse—how one kind of war argument can 
bolster another. 
LBJ’s address also underscores how war talk can be utilized 
for either progressive or conservative goals. Not only for the 
extension of equal protection of the law for average citizens, but 
also for a strong military and foreign policy. Thus, the war 
metaphor is “stickier” that its counterparts in the sense that it goes 
farther than the typical war justification in wrapping together 
disparate policies and ideas. 
2. War on Crime 
Nixon’s strategy entailed governing through criminal policy 
by recapitulating liberal war rhetoric for conservative ends. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id.  
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Having labored to “achieve a lasting peace in the world,” Nixon 
argued, the time had come to work toward “peace in our own 
land.” Yet Nixon gave the metaphor a harsher tone than LBJ. 
Once ordinary citizens viewed crime control as a cousin to armed 
conflict, it would become obvious “that the only way to attack 
crime in America is the way crime attacks our people—without 
pity.”107 Criminal offenders should be viewed as enemies with 
which citizens are in a death-struggle, who must be defeated 
without remorse. 
Nixon’s figurative use of war accomplished primarily political 
work rather than adjudicative work. First, in a partisan sense: the 
language, which emphasized a threat to security and well-being, 
was useful for fostering the impression of unity. It mobilized 
citizens already predisposed toward the Republican Party’s 
platform—the rank and file—but it also invited others 
(Independents, Southern Democrats, anyone tired of urban 
crime) to join forces with the ruling party. Nixon reprised 
Goldwater’s goal of making “crime in the streets” a national issue 
and cast it in FDR’s older Four Freedom’s rhetorical strategy, 
which had emphasized “freedom from fear.”108 The Republican 
Party would now “reestablish” American leadership on matters 
of security at home and abroad—glory that had been lost through 
years of mismanagement by the Democratic Party. 
Second, in a policy sense: the rhetoric wrapped together 
everything from a pro-death penalty position to increased 
financial and organizational resources for officers on the street. 
For Nixon, Freedom from Fear meant not only better relations 
with China, but also an unprecedented assault on criminal 
elements in America and neighboring countries.109 “Operation 
Intercept,” launched to stem the flow of drugs across the U.S.-
 107. The Law: Nixon’s Hard Line, TIME (Mar. 26, 1973), http://content.time.com/time
/magazine/article/0,9171,906998,00.html. See generally NAOMI MURAKAWA, THE FIRST 
CIVIL RIGHT: THE RISE OF THE CARCERAL STATE (book manuscript on file with author); 
JOHN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR (2007); Jonathan Simon, 
Governing Through Crime Metaphors, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 1035 (2002). In the Bush 
administration’s riff on the war metaphor, John Ashcroft urged in memoranda the need 
“to use . . . aggressive arrest and detention tactics in the war on terror” and to use “every 
available law enforcement tool” to arrest persons who “participate in, or lend support to, 
terrorist activities.” Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 598 F.3d 1129, 1131 n.1 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 108. “We shall reestablish freedom from fear in America so that America can take the 
lead of reestablishing freedom from fear in the world.” Richard Nixon, Address Accepting 
the Presidential Nomination at the Republican National Convention in Miami Beach, 
Florida (Aug. 8, 1968) available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25968. 
 109. See James Vorenberg, The War on Crime: The First Five Years, THE ATLANTIC 
MONTHLY (May 1972), http://www.theatlantic.com/past/politics/crime/crimewar.htm.  
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Mexico border, brought about a union of foreign and domestic 
domains as well as a coordination of agencies such as Treasury 
and Justice.110 
Third, in a reconstructive sense: the war on crime created a 
coherent basis for Nixon to mobilize opposition to the Warren 
Court and alter the composition of the federal courts. In 1968, 
Nixon repeatedly attacked liberal judges for aiding and abetting 
criminals through their expansive interpretation of the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. Successfully prosecuting the war on 
crime therefore required opening a new battlefront: the judiciary. 
Federal law, agencies, programs, and even interpretations of the 
U.S. Constitution would have to be reevaluated with these new 
commitments in mind. 
3. War on Drugs 
The war on drugs metaphor that became popular in the late 
twentieth century can be understood as a subset of war on crime 
rhetoric. Nixon apparently first used the formulation, “war on 
drugs,” in 1971, calling drug abuse “public enemy number one in 
the United States.” He spoke of attacking the problem “on many 
fronts.” 
Reagan’s innovation entailed explicitly characterizing the 
metaphorical war on drugs as a matter of national security and 
embarking upon initiatives with global reach. Speaking at the U.S. 
Department of Justice in 1982, President Reagan called on 
Americans to “mobilize all our forces to stop the flow of drugs 
into this country, to let kids know the truth, to erase the false 
glamour that surrounds drugs, and to brand drugs such as 
marijuana exactly for what they are—dangerous, and particularly 
to school-age youth.”111 He compared his administration’s 
determination to rid the country of drugs to the commitment of 
the French army at Verdun. Even neighborhood garden spots had 
become “a battlefield for competing drugpushers.”112 His plan 
 110. In the same vein, the War on Terror produced new networks of authority to 
national governance and arguably increased governance through secret executive orders 
and legal memoranda. See JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW 
THE WAR ON TERROR TURNED INTO A WAR ON AMERICAN IDEALS (2008). 
 111. President Ronald Reagan, Remarks on Signing Executive Order 12368, 
Concerning Federal Drug Abuse Policy Functions, June 24, 1982, available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=42671. 
 112. President Ronald Reagan, Radio Address to the Nation on Federal Drug Policy, 
Oct. 2, 1982, available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=43085..  
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consisted of attacking “youth-oriented drug culture”113 by 
“running up a battle flag.” In his second term, Reagan reaffirmed 
his belief that “drug abuse can be conquered,”114 promising to take 
the fight to schools, workplaces, and abroad. At some point, 
reducing drug abuse transformed into the “overriding goal of a 
drug-free America.”115 
The 1986 mandatory minimum sentencing guidelines and 
drug-testing programs comprised additional tools to deter drug 
use and trafficking through federal law. Waging war on drugs 
necessitated the creation of new bureaucracies for this “concerted 
campaign,” such as a national Drug Czar, anti-drug task forces 
coordinating law enforcement activities,116 and a public awareness 
campaign aimed at children. War rhetoric led to the disbursement 
of federal monies for the interdiction of drugs before they reached 
America’s shores. Military and national security agencies became 
active in drug interdiction activities, including the arrest of drug 
lords. The U.S. Attorneys offices in every state became the 
aggressive enforcers of federal drug policies. 
4. Culture War 
One of the more potent ways of encapsulating the 
constitutional stakes raised by social issues is to raise the specter 
of a fearsome “culture war.” The kulturkampf idea, taken from 
the German experience, had occasionally been used in early 
twentieth century America to discuss rising class conflict.117 Since 
the 1980s and 90s, however, the construct has been systematically 
deployed by social conservatives and prominent Republican 
figures, to describe a great religious and social battle in the public 
sphere and to issue a call to arms to defend traditional values. 
 113. President Ronald Reagan, Proclamation 5236-National Drug Abuse Education 
and Prevention Week, Sept. 21, 1984, available at http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/
archives/speeches/1984/92184d.htm.. 
 114. President Ronald Reagan, Message to the Congress Transmitting a Report on a 
National Strategy for the Prevention of Drug Abuse and Drug Trafficking, Sept. 27, 1984, 
available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=40445.. 
 115. President Ronald Reagan, Memorandum Urging Support of Federal Initiatives 
for a Drug-Free America, Oct. 4, 1986, available at http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/
archives/speeches/1986/100486b.htm. 
 116. President Ronald Reagan, Remarks Announcing Federal Initiatives Against 
Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime, Oct. 14, 1982, available at http://www.presidency. 
ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=43127. 
 117. In Canada, the term has lately been used to describe values-based conflict along 
regional lines.  
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For instance, in 1992, Patrick Buchanan’s speech at the 
Republican National Convention described “a religious war going 
on in our country for the soul of America.”118 He called it “a 
cultural war, as critical to the kind of nation we will one day be as 
was the Cold War itself.” Buchanan’s move—to pile one extended 
metaphor on top of another—illustrates some of the dangers 
already identified. One set of issues (relations with the Soviet 
Union and the world) had been acceptably defined as a multi-
generational militarized struggle, and now Buchanan hoped to 
draw upon the legitimacy and perceived success of that conflict to 
mobilize an internal fight over public morality. If elected 
president, Buchanan promised to use “the full extent of my power 
and ability” to “defend American traditions and the values of 
faith, family, and country.”119 
In its contemporary incarnation, the culture-as-war 
metaphor captures a broad range of dissenting views on 
constitutional development. Among the issues Buchanan 
highlighted were abortion, gay rights, “discrimination against 
religious schools,” “purveyors of sex and violence” (presumably 
through expansive free speech protections), and women in 
combat.120 Others have extended these complaints to cover any 
policy or law that affects the family, the public role of women and 
sexual minorities, religious freedom and expressive liberty. 
Operationally, the contrast invites the people to take sides: to 
either be with authentic values and those who might wish to 
destroy all that is good about American law and culture. Thus, the 
aligning function of a potent constitutional metaphor (whose side 
are you on?) and its redirecting function (of influence over social 
issues away from courts toward the church or elected assemblies) 
are most prominent. 
Once adopted by lawyers and jurists, the metaphor can take 
on additional regime-altering tones. The most prominent user of 
the litigation-as-war model has been Justice Scalia, who has 
consistently deployed the tool when discussing gay rights issues.121 
 118. Patrick J. Buchanan, Speech to the Republican National Convention, Aug. 17, 
1992, available at http://buchanan.org/blog/1992-republican-national-convention-speech-
148. 
 119. Patrick J. Buchanan, Announcement Speech, Mar. 20, 1995, available at 
http://edition.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1996/candidates/republican/withdrawn/buch.anno
uncement.shtml. 
 120. Buchanan, RNC Speech, supra note 118. 
 121. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Romer v. 
Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). The metaphor’s popularity is further  
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By characterizing the equal protection claims of gay Americans as 
implicating a “culture war,” he implies several things: gay citizens 
started the fight by assaulting majoritarian values; gay rights by 
their nature raise different kinds of jurisprudential problems; 
judicial review will inflame rather than reduce or redirect cultural 
conflict; and such matters are better left for the political branches 
because decisions inevitably entail “tak[ing] sides in the culture 
war.”122 
But there is potentially something more dramatic in Justice 
Scalia’s use of the term. He also appears to be launching a subtle, 
though popular, assault on the Carolene Products framework, 
which has long been utilized to authorize intermittent judicial 
involvement in politics to protect “discrete and insular 
minorities.”123 In his deployment of the war metaphor, Justice 
Scalia is not only suggesting that sexual minorities are not such 
minorities worthy of protection, but may even be undermining the 
framework itself. If the metaphorical approach were to be taken 
seriously in the legal domain, it would reorganize the courts’ 
relationship to other institutions, rights claimants, and the 
Constitution in important ways. First, legal questions implicating 
strong cultural or religious values might be placed beyond the 
reach of courts. Taking Scalia’s conflict avoidance rhetoric 
seriously might lead to the creation of a tiered or rule—and—
exception standard to the treatment of individual rights. Second, 
doing so would introduce a potentially unprincipled threshold 
question into nearly every adjudicatory proceeding implicating 
the Bill of Rights. Third, it would effectively alter the relationship 
between federal courts that could review such matters and the 
many states in which “cultural” issues would arise. States that are 
especially active on such social questions might, under Scalia’s 
approach, be entitled to greater leeway to make value-laden 
judgments. 
It is hard to know for certain how to operationalize Scalia’s 
insights, and that vagueness underscores a major defect of the 
litigation-as-war metaphor. The construct plays on popular 
evidence of intent to do primarily political work: rousing social conservatives, ridiculing 
legal liberals, encouraging other jurists to stay their hand. 
 122. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 602 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 123. To be sure, some critics of Carolene Products have found the approach outdated 
and suggested alternatives that would be sufficiently protective of minority rights. See, e.g., 
Bruce Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985); Kenji 
Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769 (2002). Justice Scalia’s culture war metaphor, 
however, contends that equal protection jurisprudence is overly protective of minority 
rights and is accompanied by no alternative framework.  
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concerns about judicial overreaching, and some citizens’ moral 
and policy preferences against gay rights, but he never tells us 
what it would mean for judges to start carving out subject matter 
issues from judicial review. Justice Scalia could disclaim any of the 
doctrinal consequences that might come with taking the 
comparison between cultural debate and warmaking seriously. In 
the meantime, he has gained attention for anti-gay forces and 
institutional conservatives alike, rallying elites and ordinary 
people through strategic ambiguity. Though highly quotable, the 
war metaphor in judicial rulings appears to accomplish more 
political work than jurisprudential. 
5. War on Terror 
President George Bush’s metaphorical war on terror had its 
genesis in the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks by Islamic Jihadists. On 
September 20, 2001, President Bush gave a speech to a Joint 
Session of Congress in which he declared, for the first time, “war 
on terror.”124 Although they did not appear to be state-sponsored, 
President Bush characterized the terrorist attacks by Al Qaeda as 
an “act of war against our country” by the “enemies of 
freedom.”125 Though counterterrorist efforts do not involve 
conventional enemies or tactics, war-talk primed the public for an 
open-ended conflict licensing aggressive, overwhelming, and 
creative technologies: “We will direct every resource at our 
command, every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, 
every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, 
and every necessary weapon of war, to the disruption and to the 
defeat of the global terror network.”126 
President Bush warned that it would be hard to identify clean 
victories or even an end to the need for war. Unlike the first war 
against Iraq, there will be no “decisive liberation of territory and 
a swift conclusion.” Rather, it will involve a “lengthy 
campaign.”127 Note that war rhetoric had now been adapted for 
open-ended conflict: “Our war on terror begins with Al Qaida, 
 124. President George W. Bush, Address to the Joint Session of the 107th Congress, 
Sept. 20, 2001, available at http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Selected_Speeches_George_W_
Bush.pdf. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. For accounts of the events and major players in this legal transformation, see 
JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH 
ADMINISTRATION (2009); MAYER, supra note 109. 
 127. President Bush, Address to Congress, supra note 124.  
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but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group 
of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated.”128 The war 
on terror is to protect “our way of life,” perhaps even civilization 
itself. 
Once again, the war-on-terror formulation divided the world 
into two camps: allies and enemies. “Every nation, in every 
region, now has a decision to make,” as President Bush declared. 
“Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.”129 
Constituents and other legal actors heard a similar message: 
public policies and legal rules must help our allies and hurt our 
enemies. Legal uncertainty or modesty could only embolden 
terrorists. The invocation of inflexible communal boundaries 
points the way to simplistic answers, almost always intended to 
rationalize the use of force. Critically, presidential orations 
advancing this view of terrorism altered the political environment 
in which official legal arguments are made and evaluated by 
others. 
As vague and troublesome as the rhetorical technique can be 
in political domains, the perils are of a different order of 
magnitude in the realm of constitutional interpretation.130 War as 
a metaphor has the potential for destroying legal limits, or at least 
blurring lines sufficiently to render institutional checks 
inoperable. The problem of rhetorical layering described 
earlier—of different kinds of war-dependent arguments 
sustaining one another—is dramatized by ongoing 
counterterrorism efforts. Even as political actors advanced the 
terror-as-war metaphor in public discourse, legal actors pushed 
other war-inspired arguments in legal memoranda and briefs. War 
metaphors piled on top of war justifications made it difficult to 
evaluate these arguments. 
For instance, attorneys at the Office of Legal Counsel argued 
in June 2002 that America found itself in “a state of armed 
conflict.”131 Then-Assistant Attorney General Jay Bybee argued, 
that war began with the attacks of September 11, which justified 
America’s armed response to “subdue the al Qaeda terrorist 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Louis Henkin observes an added problem: war and terrorism separately are 
troublesome concepts not clearly defined in international law. See Louis Henkin, War and 
Terrorism: Law or Metaphor, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 817, 820-22 (2005). Neither is 
mentioned in the U.N. Charter. Thus, mixing such popular, fluid notions in constitutional 
discourse can create more problems than they solve. 
 131. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee to the Att’y Gen., Determination of Enemy 
Belligerency and Military Detention, June 8, 2002, at 2–3.  
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network and the Taliban regime” in the broadest possible sense. 
Congressional support itself did not “distinguish between 
deployment of the military either at home or abroad,” but the 
president’s inherent power is not limited in such a fashion either. 
Just as important, executive branch lawyers did not believe the 
war to be conventional in nature or scope. Instead of fighting a 
“traditional nation-state,” America “is at war with an 
international terrorist organization, whose members have entered 
the nation covertly and have infiltrated our society in sleeper 
cells.”132 The state’s ability to confront its enemies must adapt to 
this new threat. Accordingly, the government had lawful authority 
to detain Jose Padilla, a U.S. citizen believed to be associated with 
Al Qaeda, as an unlawful enemy combatant subject only to the 
laws of war. 
The thrust of Bybee’s letter may have focused on the 
detention of parties linked to organizations responsible for the 
9/11 attacks, but other legal memoranda extended the war 
rationale to other contexts. OLC advanced the terrorism-as-war 
argument to claim that the president had inherent authority to 
convene military tribunals to try detainees, who would not enjoy 
constitutional protections in that setting.133 For the Bush 
administration, the war on terror was, for all legal purposes, 
equivalent to the prosecution of past wars in determining the 
scope of presidential power. For precedent, lawyers cited 
President Washington’s appointment of a Board of General 
Officers to try a suspected spy, President Jackson’s creation of 
military tribunals to try English suspects accused of inciting Creek 
Indians to war with the United States, and in-the-field decisions 
by military officers to administer justice during the Mexican 
American War and the Civil War.134 Once the analogy was 
accepted, lawyers argued, actions taken in the name of the war on 
terror are subject only to the rules governing the laws of war 
rather than constitutional protections articulated in the Bill of 
Rights. 
 132. Id. at 6. 
 133. See Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzalez from Patrick F. Philbin, Legality of 
the Use of Military Commissions to Try Terrorists, Nov. 6, 2001 [hereinafter Philbin, 
Legality of the Use of Military Commissions]. 
 134. Id. at 8. The Civil War has played a prominent role in justifying sweeping 
presidential authority to deter and repel attacks on domestic soil. See Memorandum for 
Alberto R. Gonzalez & William J. Haynes from John C. Yoo & Robert J. Delahunty, 
Authority for Use of Military Force to Combat Terrorist Activities Within the United States, 
Oct. 23, 2001, at 10.  
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But how should one determine in the first place whether a 
state of war exists? The administration’s approach blurred various 
terms of art, including “war,” “state of war,” “armed attack,” and 
“terrorism.” Whatever the case may be, OLC lawyers argued that, 
despite the Constitution’s vesting of the power to declare war in 
Congress, the president as Commander in Chief possesses “full 
authority to determine when the nation has been thrust into a 
conflict that must be recognized as a state of war and treated 
under the laws of war.”135 That determination, moreover, is a 
political decision that cannot be countermanded by the courts. 
OLC lawyers proceeded to state the case for Al Qaeda’s 
attacks to be treated as “more akin to war than terrorism.”136 
Focusing on the destructiveness of the 9/11 attacks, legal memos 
claimed that the death toll (some 3,000 lives lost) “surpasses that 
at Pearl Harbor, and rivals the toll at the battle of Antietam in 
1862, one of the bloodiest engagements in the Civil War.” In an 
important and far-reaching move, lawyers also encouraged 
readers to treat past acts of terrorism, regardless of the instigators, 
“as part of that continuing series of attacks” and as “a systematic 
campaign of hostilities.”137 
Separately, lawyers defended the accuracy of the metaphor 
because in calling for jihad against the United States, bin Laden 
had started a “self-proclaimed war.”138 On this view, a state of war 
exists in part when an attacking party calls it a war. The problem 
is that reliance on others is fraught with problems of inter-system 
translation, namely, whether a legal actor’s words and actions in 
one legal order mean the same thing when he uses similar 
terminology in another legal system. A further complication is 
that according to bin Laden’s call for jihad against Jews and 
Western invaders, he arguably makes the same claim: that others 
initiated armed conflict against Muslims so they, in turn, are 
justified in repelling violence with violence.139 
OLC memoranda underscore my concern about cross-
domain bolstering. Lawyers argued that the fight against terror 
should be treated as a war in part because the president himself 
had already “described the current situation as a ‘war’” and taken 
 135. Philbin, Legality of the Use of Military Commissions, supra note 133, at 22. 
 136. Yoo & Delahunty, supra note 134, at 2. 
 137. Philbin, Legality of the Use of Military Commissions, supra note 133, at 28. 
 138. Id. 
 139. See, e.g., Bernard Lewis, License to Kill: Usama bin Ladin’s Declaration of Jihad, 
77 FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Nov.-Dec. 1998, available at http://www. foreignaffairs.com/articles/
54594/bernard-lewis/license-to-kill-usama-bin-ladins-declaration-of-jihad.  
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actions consistent with that understanding.140 Political rhetoric 
now was being harnessed to shape legal interpretation. Lawyers 
did so in two ways: first, by formally demanding that courts defer 
to a presidential description of hostilities as a war, and second, by 
inviting the courts to adopt and replicate the president’s war 
characterization. The overall strategy entailed seeking what I 
have previously called “rhetorical congruence”: an appearance of 
political-legal consensus among the branches of government.141 To 
put it simply, the approach involves political actors aggressively 
declaring a constitutional vision and inviting others (for the sake 
of institutional cooperation or social unity) to tow the party line. 
To the extent that courts speak about a social phenomenon in 
ways preferred by political actors, the field in which constitutional 
decisions are rendered has already shifted. Constitutional 
struggles entail fights over not simply outcomes but also public 
terminology, background facts, and institutional habits. Victories 
in how other actors or ordinary citizens view a situation can 
increase the odds of legal success as well as how setbacks are 
perceived. 
At the same time that lawyers wished to enjoy all of the 
consequences of describing counterterrorism as warmaking, they 
did not want to be saddled by all its limitations. They did not want 
to be overly constrained by the war metaphor because of the law 
of war’s dominant metaphor: war as a game, one generally fought 
by national armies under rules of fair competition. If fighting 
terror was akin to making war, then the Bush administration 
nevertheless insisted on even greater flexibility in fighting a new 
kind of “war.” First, unlike many past wars, “this conflict may take 
place, in part, on the soil of the United States.” It no longer made 
sense to talk of the “war front” separately from the “home front” 
or of restricting the government’s power along such dimensions. 
Second, U.S. fought clandestine organizations and individuals 
rather than traditional nation-states. Legal rules created to 
protect “non-combatant civilian populations” would have to be 
reconsidered. 
In short, the “scale of the violence involved in this conflict” 
as well as the ill-fitting quality of the war metaphor required 
altering well-settled treaties, laws, and constitutional rights. 
 140. Philbin, Legality of the Use of Military Commissions, supra note 133, at 29. In 
particular, lawyers pointed out the president’s decision to mobilize the armed forces and 
reserves. 
 141. See generally TSAI, ELOQUENCE AND REASON, supra note 27; Tsai, 
Reconsidering Gobitis, supra note 27, at 382–83.  
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Through a series of legal memos and policy directives, the Bush 
administration pursued an expansive theory of presidential power 
and effectuated a major transformation in how the First, Fourth, 
Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments are 
understood. 
Inherent problems with the terror-as-war formulation linger. 
The rhetorical needs for adjudication are not identical to those for 
political mobilization. As Justice O’Connor pointed out in Hamdi, 
though national security is no doubt implicated by U.S. efforts 
against terrorism, the “war on terror” formulation makes claims 
of national security “broad and malleable.”142 This suggests that 
judicial decisionmakers find war metaphors difficult to assess and 
worse, perhaps renders programs unsusceptible to rational 
review. The metaphorical strategy invites endorsement of highly 
coercive policies to meet a grave threat. And, over time, it lowers 
institutional resistance to “indefinite or perpetual” programs by 
reference to vague, though ongoing threats of unknown origin or 
duration. 
The chain of connotations that might initially be resisted as 
awkward or absurd can eventually become naturalized through 
repeated usage. Hamdi, decided in 2007, put quotation marks 
around “War on Terror” to mark the phrase as the 
administration’s own. In more recent years, jurists have taken to 
describing the War on Terror as a historical fact.143 Although the 
sample is small, the pattern seems somewhat more pronounced in 
the D.C. Circuit. There are a few possible explanations. It might 
be that judges are more institutionally or ideologically 
conservative on certain courts, or it could be that, having 
encountered repeated legal controversies involving terrorism 
(along with the administration’s aggressive framing of the stakes), 
judges have internalized the politically preferred terminology. 
Having done so, they then set about reproducing the vision 
preferred by public officials. In these moments, jurists accomplish 
more political work than jurisprudential. Once completed, that 
work, in the law as in politics, may no longer need the original 
linguistic infrastructure to sustain it. 
 142. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 520 (2004). 
 143. See, e.g., Abdah v. Obama, 630 F.3d 1047, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 2011); ACLU v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Defense, 628 F.3d 612, 617 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 
873 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 1009 (D.C. Cir. 2007).  
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B. RULE OF LAW CONCERNS 
Metaphors can be powerful tools by which to organize 
ideologies, knit together disparate legal and policy positions, and 
put opponents on the defensive. There are any number of 
ordinary metaphors that have been proven useful for elucidating 
legal ideas.144 Even so, war metaphors in public debate may be 
particularly insidious. First, they can inject fears over first-order 
survival into questions that might, properly evaluated, raise no 
such foundational concerns. Second, war metaphors may facilitate 
extreme measures when complexity or modesty in legal design are 
more appropriate. Third, they invite overly abstract debate in a 
context where transparency and accountability are at a premium. 
Fourth, the expansive quality of war metaphors can facilitate 
mission creep.145 
In theory, it may be possible to undermine a prevalent 
metaphor by subverting it. More often, what happens is that a 
potent metaphor gets recycled so that competing constructs 
become available in an existing body of knowledge.146 Historical 
practice seems to bear this out. The more entrenched patterns in 
law and politics suggest that it has been far easier for opponents 
of one type of war metaphor to simply repurpose it for a different 
agenda rather than to undermine the metaphor’s basic structure. 
Progressives had their favorite war metaphor; over time, 
conservatives built their own versions of the war metaphor. 
During this process, each side has merely reinforced the basic 
cultural and cognitive features of that metaphor, enhancing its 
transformative potential rather than destroying it. 
Opponents of a war metaphor may be best advised to engage 
in the politics of the literal. Showing all the ways in which a social 
problem differs from military conquest is a start. It may also be 
productive to demonstrate how the policy problem-as-war 
metaphor implicitly excludes such considerations as morality or 
 144. See GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (2003); 
TSAI, ELOQUENCE AND REASON, supra note 27; STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE 
FOREST: LAW, LIFE, MIND (2003); Thomas W. Joo, Contract, Property, and the Role of 
Metaphor in Corporations Law, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 779 (2002); Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, 
Metaphors, Models, and Meaning in Contract Law, 116 PENN. ST. L. REV. 987 (2012); 
Robert L. Tsai, Fire, Metaphor, and Constitutional Myth-Making, 93 GEO. L.J. 181 (2004). 
 145. Cf. Susan Stuart, War as Metaphor and the Rule of Law in Crisis: The Lessons We 
Should Have Learned from the War on Drugs, 36 S. ILL. U. L.J. 1, 4 (2011) (contending that 
the war on drugs did not originally target teenagers but did so over time). 
 146. For instance, property and fire metaphors in First Amendment law, originally 
yielding anti-speech outcomes, have been repurposed over time to facilitate more 
expansive protections for expressive liberty. See generally TSAI, ELOQUENCE AND 
REASON, supra note 27, at 49–77.  
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feasibility. Still another tactic would be to highlight the serious, 
understated costs of treating a domestic social problem like a 
problem of national self-defense. These approaches reject the 
propriety of the implicit analogy being drawn without denying the 
necessity of preparation for an actual war. The overly simplistic, 
seemingly natural linkages between fighting a war and tackling a 
social problem may simply fall away. 
This is not to say that symbolism should be altogether 
avoided. After all, constitutional discourse is in part an exercise in 
popular lawmaking. If there are sounder metaphorical models to 
be presented, ones that better encapsulate a social issue without 
the attendant problems of characterizing it in warlike terms, then 
all the better. President Obama has used the punishment 
metaphor in describing his policy on Syria.147 While this law-and-
order construct has its problems, the metaphor nevertheless poses 
fewer risks from the standpoint of constitutional transformation. 
The key is to find ways of talking about social problems that 
are effective while drawing away excessive heat and urgency. For 
reasons of efficiency and short-term solidarity, it is tempting to 
move to language that mobilizes people and institutions quickly. 
But strident discourse is also likely to generate (if not right away, 
then down the road), a significant amount of pushback. The 
strength of a popular reaction will determine whether a rapid 
transformation becomes a lasting one. Calling counterterrorism 
efforts part of a global “war on terror” allowed an ad hoc working 
group in the Bush administration to alter long-standing legal 
commitments in a host of areas, foreign and domestic. But doing 
so also disrupted diplomatic relations, led to key OLC legal 
memos to be repudiated and withdrawn, and paved the way for 
the election of a Democratic president who campaigned against 
such changes. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Does it matter how we talk about war? This paper has 
proceeded on the premise that words matter a great deal when we 
inject war-dependent arguments into debates over the 
Constitution. Although war constitutionalism is an old practice, 
how we choose to talk about war affects not only how power and 
rights are understood, but also what we choose to remember to be 
 147. See George Lakoff, Obama Reframes Syria: Metaphor and War Revisited, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 6, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/george-lakoff/obama-
reframes-syria-meta_b_3879335.html.  
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important about our war experiences. War rhetoric possesses a 
transformative capacity, and that potential must always be 
carefully justified, scrutinized, and disciplined. 
As we have seen, war constitutionalism can help to 
fundamentally alter the environment in which claims over powers 
and rights are decided. The layering of different war-dependent 
arguments, the conditioning of the citizenry to tolerate claims 
about war, and the constant manipulation of political memories 
foster a war-laden legal culture. Once a lynchpin decision is 
made—whether its resembles Barnette or Hirabayashi—future 
decisions can be built upon its infrastructure without being as 
visible or explanatory. The war weary can become more amenable 
to such arguments, without the level of engagement one would 
want in a democratic society. In such an environment, it becomes 
imperative to be watchful for both visible changes to the law and 
mindful of the foreseeable use of legal arguments. 
I began this essay by observing that President Obama had, 
upon taking office, changed the way he publicly discussed 
America’s counterterrorism program. No longer would he use the 
counterterrorism-as-war metaphor, though he freely engaged 
other forms of war-dependent arguments for a host of domestic 
and foreign policy purposes. But changing the overarching 
rhetoric may be less important once new institutions and 
rationales have been established. By several measures—the 
ferocity and frequency of drone strikes, the continuation of 
renditions, the dogged pursuit of terrorists across national 
boundaries—military efforts against terror continue unabated, 
just under a different moniker. 
My goal has been modest: to begin a conversation about the 
nature of America’s war-saturated legal culture and to begin to 
tease apart the multiple ways that war-dependent arguments are 
made during constitutional debate. Strong normative solutions 
are beyond the scope of this essay, though one can imagine several 
possible remedies: (1) more rigorous use of historical methods 
when past wars are cited as precedent; (2) highly fact-specific 
rulings when war justifications are made; (3) open consideration 
of downstream doctrinal consequences to counteract the logic of 
war instrumentalism; (4) more historical proof both to authorize 
war legacy claims and to determine the scope of any asserted war-
inspired legal principles; (5) greater specificity in articulating the 
scope of war legacy arguments and principles; and (6) a 
moratorium on war metaphors in judicial rulings. 
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Whether implementing these or other methods during 
judicial decision making can help to discipline war 
constitutionalism I will leave for another day, for doing the topic 
justice requires a systematic accounting of methods and contexts, 
and careful consideration of the tradeoffs of each possible 
measure. In the meantime, appreciating the different forms that 
war arguments take will hopefully serve as an important first step, 
helping us to assert more control over a militarized culture instead 
of allowing that culture to wreak havoc with our legal order. 
 
